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BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1980
I. SOMETHING FOR NOTHING: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO INCOME
FROM CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS
HE creation of taxable income normally requires the occurrence of
a taxable event, the character or form of which may vary considera-
bly. With respect to dealings in property, a taxable event typically
occurs when gain is realized' and is included in gross income.2 In transac-
tions not involving the transfer, sale, or exchange of property, ordinary
income may accrue under an accession to wealth or net benefit theory,3
which results in the creation of gross income. In a typical loan transaction,
however, where a debtor borrows funds, no realization of gain or net ac-
cession to wealth generally exists, and no taxable event therefore occurs
upon which to justify taxation. These conclusory tax results are premised
on the balanced economic position of the debtor after the loan transaction;
while the loan proceeds increase the debtor's assets, his liabilities are corre-
spondingly increased, thereby causing no increase in the debtor's net
worth. Thus, no income tax is imposed on the debtor with respect to the
cash proceeds of the loan.4
Complete cancellation or reduction of the debtor's loan obligation to
repay the creditor, however, will give rise to a taxable event under either of
1. Income tax generally is not imposed on unrealized but accrued gain that reflects the
appreciation in value of property held by the taxpayer. Only when the taxpayer makes a
substantial change in his economic position with respect to a given asset will the justification
arise for imposing a tax on the accrued gain. Thus, one prerequisite to the imposition of
income tax is the disposition of appreciated property in a "realization" transaction. The
early case of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), established the general rule that
property must be disposed of in some type of realization transaction to justify taxation of its
accrued gain. In Eisner the Court held unconstitutional Congress's attempt to tax the
recipeint of stock dividends because no "income," defined as "the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined," was present. Id at 207 (quoting Stratton's Indepen-
dence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)). The Eisner definition of realization of
income, however, has not served as a universal benchmark. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940); Prescott v. Commissioner, 561
F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1977). See generally Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income
Tax.: Some Implications of Recent Decisions, 35 ILL, L. REV. 779 (1941).
Additionally, Treasury Regulations define "realization" as the gain or loss realized from
the "conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property
differing materially either in kind or in extent." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a), T.D. 7142, 1971-2
C.B. 295. Assuming a transaction constitutes a realization event, the next inquiry is to deter-
mine if the realized gain or loss is recognized. I.R.C. § 1001(a). Thereafter, one must deter-
mine whether the recognized gain or loss is excepted from recognition by a statutory or
judicial nonrecognition rule. See, e.g., id §§ 351, 1031, 1033.
2. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
3. Whether an economic benefit received by a taxpayer constituted gross income was
the issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279
U.S. 716 (1929). The proposition developed in Old Colony Trust Co. and later cases focuses
on the net benefit or "accession to wealth' accruing to the taxpayer. See, e.g., Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). The general tenor of this broad-based rule also
can be found in § 61, which defines gross income as "all income from whatever source de-
rived." I.R.C. § 61. Unless otherwise excluded, an economic benefit or accession to wealth
with respect to a given taxpayer generally will constitute ordinary income and not a capital
gain, due to the absence of a sale or exchange. See id § 1222. Although the sources from
which ordinary income and capital gain emanate are conceptually divergent, their respective
authorities for taxability both lie in § 61. See generally id § 61.
4. See notes 1, 3 supra.
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two theories. First, the debtor can be deemed to have experienced an ac-
cession to wealth to the extent of the loan cancellation or reduction; the net
proceeds from the loan fall within the "income from discharge of indebt-
edness" classification of gross income.5 Alternatively, the debt cancella-
tion can be viewed as a gain realized from the transfer of property to
which the debt relates, or perhaps even the transfer of the debt obligation
itself, in exchange for the cancellation or reduction of the debt.6 The ap-
plicability of either theory depends on the nature of the transaction in
which the cancellation or modification of indebtedness arises.7 In any
event, when cancellation or reduction of the debt occurs, requiring the
debtor to recognize as income an amount equal to the debt cancellation
generally is considered appropriate in the absence of special
circumstances. 8
While the concept that debt cancellation or reduction results in taxable
income may appear to be a simplistic one, several years of judicial deci-
sions coupled with congressional and administrative action have cultivated
the cancellation of indebtedness garden into a vast and seemingly endless
field of havoc. The underlying guidelines with respect to cancellation of
indebtedness income are widely divergent, highly technical, and in several
instances irreconcilable with taxation theory and basic economics. 9 In an
attempt to provide certainty in the debt cancellation area and to coordinate
bankruptcy law and tax law, the well-intended, but in several respects ill-
conceived, Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198010 was signed into law by President
Carter on December 24, 1980.
5. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). See also note 3 supra.
6. See note I supra. For an excellent discussion of the taxation issues arising from
cancellation of indebtedness, see Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal In-
come Tax: A Problem t Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REV. 225 (1959).
7. For example, when property other than money is transferred by the debtor in can-
cellation of indebtedness, the debt discharge is deemed to arise by sale or exchange, with the
amount of the gain measured by the excess of the debt over the debtor's adjusted basis in the
transferred property. See R. O'Dell & Sons v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948);
Welch v. Street, 116 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1941); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15
(1979); Rev. Rut. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. On the other hand, when no property is trans-
ferred in the cancellation transaction, the debtor realizes ordinary income to the exent of
debt cancellation, due to the absence of a sale or exchange. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. United
States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939). But cf. I.R.C. § 1232 (retirement of certain corporate obligations
treated as sale or exchange). For an excellent discussion of the various means of debt dis-
charge and their effect on the classification of income, see Eustice, supra note 6, at 231-36.
See also Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness Redux." The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 Pro-
posals-Corporate Aspects, 36 TAx L. REV. 1 (1980).
8. See text accompanying notes 11-14 infra.
9. See generally text accompanying notes 11-71 infra.
10. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389. The genesis of the
Act was the result of recommendations from the Commissioner on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States, whose proposals ultimately were enacted into law as a major overhaul of
the bankruptcy laws. Eustice, supra note 7, at 1.
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II. AN APE-LIKE GROWTH: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CANCELLATION
OF INDEBTEDNESS DOCTRINE BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY TAX
ACT OF 1980
4. Judicial Development- The Kirby Lumber Rule
In United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. "the Supreme Court, in a cryptic
one-page opinion, ruled that where a corporate debtor purchased its own
bonds on the open market at a price less than the face amount of such
bonds, the corporate debtor "realized within the year an accession to in-
come" to the extent that the principal amount of each bond exceeded its
purchase price. The Court reasoned that the net amount of debt cancelled
(the excess of the face amount of the bonds over their purchase price) did
not reflect a concomitant "shrinkage of assets" of the corporation. Because
the net economic position of the corporation in Kirby Lumber failed to
remain in balance, i e., the taxpayer's net worth increased as a result of the
debt cancellation, the transaction could not have constituted a mere repay-
ment of debt. 12 The Kirby Lumber holding, which reversed prior law, 13
sets forth the basic proposition that taxable income will be realized and
thus recognized to the extent indebtedness of a taxpayer is cancelled, un-
less some nonrecognition rule applies. 14 While the reasoning underlying
the Kirby Lumber rule seems clear, for several years the courts, Congress,
11. 284 U.S. 1 (1931). The Court in Kirby Lumber relied to some extent on the uncited
Treasury Regulations supposedly related to the Revenue Act of 1921. The Regulations pro-
vided that if the corporation purchased and retired any bonds at a price less than the issuing
price or face value, the excess of the issuing price or face value over the purchase price
constituted gain or income for the taxable year. Id at 3. The interchanged usage of the
terms "gain" and "income" makes unclear whether the Court intended cancellation of in-
debtedness to result in income A la Glenshaw Glass, or as gain from dealings in property with
the attendant realization concept of Eisner. See notes 1, 3, 7 supra. See also Eustice, supra
note 6, at 230. For a thorough discussion of the evolutionary development of the taxation of
cancellation of indebtedness income area, see id at 228-31.
12. See note 14 infra.
13. See, e.g., Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926); Burnet v. John F.
Campbell Co., 50 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1931). The Regulations later adopted the Kirby Lum-
ber approach with respect to corporate open market purchases at a discount. Treas. Reg.§ 1.61--12(c)(3), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 38; cf. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. United States, 417
F.2d 670, 672-74 (9th Cir. 1969) (corporation that acquired notes with funds derived in part
from stockholders of obligor corporation did not acquire its own indebtedness because
transaction had economic substance).
14. Accordingly, one can theorize that the Kirby Lumber rule simply recognizes the
basic accounting treatment of cancellation of indebtedness: to decrease or debit the loan
payable and to increase or credit income or retained earnings. This results in a net benefit or
increase in the net worth of the debtor, because as this accounting entry demonstrates, the
debtor's liability is shifted into an income account with no offsetting reduction of cash or
other asset. The nature or underlying character of the cancellation transaction will deter-
mine whether capital gain or ordinary income results. See note 7 supra. Note, however, that
the manner in which the cancellation transaction occurs seemingly will not matter for pur-
poses of seeking relief under the postponement of income rule of I.R.C. § 108. S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1954); see text. accompanying notes 38-56 infra. See also
Eustice, supra note 6, at 276. In recent years, however, the courts have limited the breadth
of the special nonrecognition treatment of § 108 so as to exclude cancellation of indebted-
ness income that results from the transfer, sale, or exchange of property in discharge of the
underlying indebtedness. See, e.g., Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979);
Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.
1981).
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and the Internal Revenue Service have developed a myriad of exceptions
and exceptions-to-exceptions with respect to this general rule. The result
of this tampering has been a great deal of uncertainty, complexity, and
general confusion.
B. Cancellation of Indebtedness Income- Exceptions to the Kirby
Lumber Rule Before Passage of the Bankruptcy Tax Act
of 1980
The Kirby Lumber rule, which eventually was codified and adopted by
the Treasury Regulations,'5 is subject to several complex and sometimes
irreconcilable judicial, regulatory, and statutory exceptions, most of which
are now dealt with by the Act. A principal exception is the so-called "in-
solvency" exception, 16 which generally provides that no income will be
realized from the discharge of indebtedness if the debtor is insolvent both
before and after the transaction in which the discharge arose. To the ex-
tent the debtor is made solvent as a result of the discharge, however, can-
cellation of indebtedness income may result. 17 Indeed, the rationale for
this exception is to permit an insolvent debtor who otherwise would realize
income upon cancellation of indebtedness to avoid the additional drain
caused by increased tax liability on a possibly nonexistent cash flow. Thus,
cancellation of an insolvent taxpayer's debt apparently does not result in a
sufficient net economic benefit to the insolvent debtor that would justify
taxation. The logic of basing a system of taxation on the taxpayer's net
worth or financial ability to pay taxes rather than on income generation,
however, is debatable, because income results from the cancellation of
debt whether or not the debtor is insolvent.'s
Another exception to the Kirby Lumber rule is the "shareholder cancel-
15. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1960).
16. See Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95 (5th
Cir. 1934). See also Astoria Marine Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 798 (1949); Kra-
mon Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 342 (1944), acq. 1944 C.B. 17; Madison Rys. v.
Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 1106 (1937). The Regulations also have adopted the insolvency
exception in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, so long as the fair market value of the
debtor's assets do not exceed his liabilities after such proceedings. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
12(b)(l) (1960). The term "insolvency" in this context generally means an excess of the
debtor's liabilities over the fair market value of his assets, including intangibles such as
goodwill. Conestoga Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 506 (1951), acq. 1952-1 C.B. 2.
See also Davis v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 814 (1978). In Davis the Service unsuccessfully
argued that the fair market value of the debtor's business expertise, business relationships,
and assets exempt from creditors should be included in the debtor's net worth calculation.
Id at 834. In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that such expertise and exempt
assets were not included in the debtor's estate by the Bankruptcy Act, and that inclusion of
such items in the net worth calculation would cause substantial valuation problems. Id.
17. Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
12(b) (1960). The insolvency exception will apply even when the cancelled debt resulted in
some type of previous tax benefit. 1180 E. 63rd St. Bldg. Corp., 12 T.C. 437 (1949). But cf.
I.R.C. § 11 l(b)(4) (amount of bad debt that is excluded from gross income includes only
amount that did not result in reduction of tax).
18. See Eustice, supra note 6, at 246. To adhere more closely to tax theory, the insol-
vency exception perhaps should concede that cancellation of indebtedness constitutes the
realization of cancellation of indebtedness income, but reach the result of nontaxability on
the policy grounds that such income should not be recognized.
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lation of corporate indebtedness" rule. A gratuitous cancellation of the
indebtedness of a corporation to its shareholder generally does not give
rise to cancellation of indebtedness income. 19 The reasoning underlying
this exception is that a cancellation of debt by a shareholder-creditor in
substance represents a tax-free contribution to the capital of the debtor
corporation.20 The cancellation of the corporate debt by the shareholder-
creditor must be made in the cancelling party's capacity as a shareholder
in order for the exception to apply. 21 When the amount owed to the share-
holder previously has been deducted but never paid by an accrual basis
corporate debtor, 22 however, the applicability of this exception was un-
clear prior to the Act. In such an instance, the corporate debtor would
receive a reduction in its taxable income by reason of the accrued deduc-
tion. Because the corporate debtor avoided payment of the accrued ex-
pense by reason of the shareholder cancellation, however, the corporation
could accrue the deduction without funding it in the form of a cash pay-
ment. The overall result to the corporate debtor would be an accession to
wealth equal to the net tax benefit of the accrued but cancelled expense.
On these facts, the court in Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner23 held that a
corporate debtor was shielded from cancellation of indebtedness income
even though it previously had accrued but never paid the interest expense
giving rise to a tax benefit to the corporation.24 In Commissioner v. Fender
Sales, Inc. ,25 however, the court held to the contrary on similar facts, rely-
ing on the literal language of the regulations26 to deny the corporate
debtor the use of this exception.2 7 Thus, prior to the passage of the Act,
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1960) provides that "if a shareholder in a corporation
which is indebted to him gratuitiously forgives the debt, the transaction amounts to a contri-
bution to the capital of the corporation to the extent of the principal of the debt." The
shareholder exception to the Kirby Lumber rule has been denied when the transaction lack-
ed "shareholder intent" to upgrade the shareholder's equity portion of the corporation.
Briarcliff Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 330 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937).
20. With respect to the tax treatment of the debtor-corporation, I.R.C. § 118 generally
provides that "grosss income does not include any contribution to the capital" of such corpo-
ration. The Regulations specify that this exception will apply only "to the extent of the
principal of the debt" of the debtor-corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1960). This ex-
ception will apply to a shareholder's cancellation of interest on the debt when the interest
has not been deducted. Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.
1934); Hartland Assocs. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1580 (1970), nonacq. 1976-2 C.B. 3. But
see text accompanying notes 23-27 infra. See also Eustice, supra note 6, at 250-51.
21. If the shareholder's cancellation of a corporate debt is in some capacity other than
as a shareholder, then the corporation-shareholder nexus required by § 118 would be miss-
ing. See note 19 supra.
22. I.R.C. § 446(c)(2). An accrual basis taxpayer generally can deduct an expense when
the liability giving rise to the expense is a fixed obligation rather than a mere contingency,
and the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.461-1(a)(2) (1960).
23. 66 T.C. 652 (1976), afl'd, 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979).
24. 66 T.C. at 671.
25. 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965). See also Dwyer v.
United States, 439 F. Supp. 99 (D. Or. 1977).
26. The Regulations specifically provide that the cancellation of indebtedness exception
in the shareholder-corporation context shall apply only "to the extent of the principal of the
debt." Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1960).
27. The Service maintains that when interest previously has been accrued and deducted
by the corporate debtor, resulting in the generation of a tax benefit, cancellation thereof by
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the extent to which the contribution to capital exception applied to corpo-
rate indebtedness previously accrued and deducted but never paid by the
corporate debtor was unclear.
A related exception to the Kirby Lumber rule holds that no cancellation
of indebtedness income arises if stock of the corporate debtor is issued to a
creditor in satisfaction of an outstanding corporate indebtedness. 28 This
exception applies even if the creditor already was a shareholder of the
debtor corporation, and even if the fair market value of the stock issued by
the corporate debtor is less than the face amount of the obligation satis-
fied.29 The theory underlying this exception is that the mere substitution
of corporate stock for its outstanding debt represents a continuation of an
investment in the corporate debtor in essentially the same economic
form.30 Thus, because no investment change has occurred from the corpo-
ration's viewpoint, an appropriate point has not been reached to require
the realization of cancellation of indebtedness income.3'
the shareholder-creditor is not to be shielded by the contribution to capital rule, but rather is
to be treated as income. Rev. Rul. 76-316, 1976-2 C.B. 22, superseding Rev. Rul. 73-432,
1973-2 C.B. 17. The result in Fender Sales seems to be an odd one insofar as the court held
that the cancellation of indebtedness income was properly includible in the income of the
closely held corporate shareholders rather than the corporate debtor. Although this holding
reaches the theoretically correct result, in that a tax benefit for which no cash is disbursed
and which is later cancelled should give rise to cancellation of indebtedness income, it tends
to disregard the separate taxable entities: the corporate debtor should have borne the tax
burden rather than its shareholders because the corporation experienced the direct tax bene-
fit of the accrued deduction. To justify taxation at the shareholder level, however, one can
argue that the true beneficiaries of a closely held corporation's deduction are its
shareholders.
28. Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122 (Ist Cir. 1946); Capento Sec.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942), aft'd, 140 F.2d 382 (Ist Cir. 1944). Inexplica-
ble confusion seems to exist in the debt-for-stock exchange area, where the capital structure
of a financially distressed corporation is reorganized. In addition to the Motor Mart Trust
nonrecognition of stock-for-debt rule, various statutory safe havens are available. See text
accompanying notes 38-56 infra. Furthermore, the now-repealed Bankruptcy Act provided
that no income was to be recognized by a corporation due to adjustments of its outstanding
indebtedness in a chapter X proceeding. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696,
§§ 268, 270, 52 Stat. 840, 904 (repealed 1978). The Bankruptcy Act extracted a toll charge
for this nonrecognition of cancellation of indebtedness income, however: such a corporation
had to reduce the bases of its assets by the amount of indebtedness cancelled in such pro-
ceedings, although not below fair market value. Id § 270. Additionally, I.R.C. §§ 371-374
override all other rules when the insolvency reorganization involves a transfer of the corpo-
rate debtor's assets to another corporation. In this instance no basis adustments are required
to be made to the corporate debtor's assets, notwithstanding the nonrecognition of cancella-
tion of indebtedness income. See text accompanying notes 174-207 nfira.
29. Alcazar Hotel Inc. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 872 (1943); Capento Sec. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942), ajt'd, 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944). The stock-for-debt rule
also is applicable to capitalized interest obligations of the corporate debtor. Rev. Rul. 59-98,
1959-1 C.B. 76.
30. See Eustice, supra note 6, at 239. Apart from theoretical underpinnings, generally
accepted accounting principles require that the corporate debtor debit the payable account
and credit the income account for financial reporting purposes, resulting in a "wash" trans-
action without an increase in net worth of the corporate debtor.
31. Tower Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 125 (1946), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 4. The
creditor exchanging his debt for stock will recognize gain or loss so long as the obligation
held by the excianging creditor is not debt represented by a security and the debtor is a
corporation. Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 C.B. 80. Certain other aspects of a corporate debtor's
exchange of stock for outstanding obligations should be examined. When the creditor ex-
changes outstanding securities for stock of the debtor but also receives cash or other non-
BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1980
Another exception to the Kirby Lumber rule is the "reduction of
purchase price" rule, which has been adopted by several courts. 32 Gener-
ally, when the debtor and the creditor agree as a result of direct negotia-
tions to decrease a purchase money liability incurred in connection with
the purchase of property by the debtor from the creditor, no income will be
realized with respect to such debt reduction as long as the value of the
property in question is at least equal to the indebtedness outstanding after
the reduction of the purchase money debt.33 This exception emanates
from judicial concern for financially distressed taxpayers, in that it permits
the debtor's unrealized loss in an economically depreciated asset to offset
the cancellation of indebtedness income. 34 In some instances, however,
this exception has been narrowly construed. For example, the holding in
one case was that the debtor-vendee must have a purchase money obliga-
tion secured by the property subject to the sale. 35 While the purchase price
reduction rule has been described as "irrational," 36 its continued existence
as an exception to Kirby Lumber seems well-accepted. 37
stock property, he will recognize gain to the extent of cash or other property. I.R.C. §§ 354,
356. In no event may a loss be recognized. Id § 356(c). These conclusions presuppose the
exchange of securities for stock in a tax-free reorganization. See, e.g., id §§ 368(a)(l)(E),
371(a).
32. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. A.L. Killian
Co., 128 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940).
33. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68, 70 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. A.L. Kil-
lian Co., 128 F.2d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1942); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F. 2d 656, 657-58
(7th Cir. 1942).
34. See Eustice, supra note 6, at 245. The appropriate accounting entry would debit the
payable account and credit the asset account. Consequently, no income would result. See
note 30 supra.
35. Edwards v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 275 (1952), acq. 1953-1 C.B. 4. The exception
thus appears inapplicable to indebtedness arising out of loan transactions secured by prop-
erty already owned.
36. Fifth Ave.-Fourteenth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 1944).
37. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. A.L.
Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.
1940). But see Fifth Ave.-Fourteenth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir.
1944) (exception should be applied only to cases in which vendor-mortgagee agrees to re-
duction in purchase price after negotiations directly relating to price). For a more compre-
hensive discussion of the foregoing exceptions and other exceptions to the Kirby Lumber
rule, see generally Eustice, supra note 6, at 236-53. Two other exceptions to the rule are
worthy of note: the "gift" exception and the "no accession to wealth" exception. Section
102 generally excludes from gross income any amount received as a gift or bequest. I.R.C.
§ 102. This exception is difficult to apply in an arms'-length commercial setting because a
creditor's cancellation of an unrelated debtor's obligation to repay a loan hardly involves the
detached and disinterested generosity required of gifts. See Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278 (1960). The gift exclusion seems to be a dead letter today insofar as cancella-
tion of indebtedness is concerned. See Commissioner v. Jacobsen, 336 U.S. 28, 51-52 (1949)
(cancellation of indebtedness from sale of securities creates taxable income). But see Helver-
ing v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1943) (voluntary release by creditor of
open account for rent or of interest held gift). The Court in Jacobsen distinguished American
Dental, noting that a gift will be found only when the debtor receives something for "noth-
ing" and the creditor clearly intends to make a gift. Id But cf. Hartland Assocs. v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 1580, 1586 (1970) (cancellation of interest indebtedness by shareholder-
creditor represents contribution to capital of corporation-debtor). To reach a cancellation of
indebtedness income conclusion, the debtor generally must experience some increase in his
net worth or an accession to wealth in some concrete or tangible sense. Assuming the debtor
has not experienced a net benefit with respect to the cancelled loan, e.g., a cash basis tax-
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Perhaps the most important exception to the Kirby Lumber rule was
found in section 108 before its alteration by the Act. 38 Section 108 gener-
ally permitted a debtor that otherwise would be required to recognize in-
come from debt cancellation pursuant to Kirby Lumber to elect to reduce
the basis of its assets by the amount of the debt discharged.39 The manner
in which the adjustment was made to the taxpayer's basis in assets was
described in section 1017 and the regulations thereunder.
40
The first step in analyzing the application of section 108 was to deter-
mine whether or not it would apply to a given debtor.4 1 The nonrecogni-
payer whose past-due rental obligation is cancelled, cancellation of indebtedness income
arguably should not be realized. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (2d
Cir. 1932); Fashion Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 600 (1954), nonacq. 1955-1 C.B. 7.
38. The text of all sections prior to their revision by the Bankruptcy Act of 1980 can be
found in the 1980 edition of the Internal Revenue Code and are cited as I.R.C. § - (1980).
I.R.C. § 108 (1980) provided:
No amount shall be included in gross income by reason of the discharge, in
whole or in part, within the taxable year, of any indebtedness for which the
taxpayer is liable, or subject to which the taxpayer holds property, if-
(1) the indebtedness was incurred or assumed-
(A) by a corporation, or
(B) by an individual in connection with property used in his trade or
business, and
(2) such taxpayer makes and files a consent to the regulations prescribed
under section 1017 (relating to adjustment of basis) then in effect at such
time and in such manner as the Secretary by regulations prescribes.
In such case, the amount of any income of such taxpayer attributable to any
unamortized premium (computed as of the first day of the taxable year in
which such discharge occurred) with respect to such indebtedness shall not be
included in gross income, and the amount of the deduction attributable to any
unamortized discount (computed as of the first day of the taxable year in
which such discharge occurred) with respect to such indebtedness shall not be
allowed as a deduction.
39. Id § 108(2). Prior to the passage of the Act, the § 108 election was inapplicable to
the discharge of indebtedness in any bankruptcy proceeding under either § 77(b) or chapters
X or XI of the now-repealed Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696,
§§ 101-399, 52 Stat. 840, 883-916 (repealed 1978). Nonrecognition relief was provided in
these bankruptcy instances, however, by §§ 268 and 270 of the Bankruptcy Act, assuming
similar basis adjustments to the debtor's assets were made. See note 28 supra.
40. I.R.C. § 1017 (1980) provided:
Where any amount is excluded from gross income under section 108 (relat-
ing to income from discharge of indebtedness) on account of the discharge of
indebtedness the whole or a part of the amount so excluded from gross income
shall be applied in reduction of the basis of any property held (whether before
or after the time of the discharge) by the taxpayer during any portion of the
taxable year in which such discharge occurred. The amount to be so applied
(not in excess of the amount so excluded from gross income, reduced by the
amount of any deduction disallowed under section 108) and the particular
properties to which the reduction shall be allocated, shall be determined under
regulations (prescribed by the Secretary) in effect at the time of the filing of
the consent by the taxpayer referred to in section 108. The reduction shall be
made as of the first day of the taxable year in which the discharge occurred,
except in the case of property not held by the taxpayer on such first day, in
which case it shall take effect as of the time the holding of the taxpayer began.
41. Before determining those persons to whom the nonrecognition treatment of § 108
would apply, the threshold issue had to be examined: whether the income resulting from the
cancelled or reduced indebtedness of a taxpayer would qualify for § 108 treatment. The
legislative history underlying § 108 indicated that its scope should not be limited by the
nature or form in which the cancellation of indebtedness income arose; a transfer of prop-
erty in cancellation should be treated no differently than a cancellaton not involving the
[Vol. 35
1981] BANKRUPTCY TAX.ACT OF 1980
tion rule of section 108 seemingly was available to any type of
indebtedness of a corporation. 42 In addition, section 108 applied to in-
debtedness held by an individual in connection with property used in his
trade or business. 43 The underlying theory of section 108 therefore permit-
ted certain types of debtors, confronted with possible cancellation of in-
debtedness income under Kirby Lumber, to postpone the recognition of
such realized income. This postponed recognition of income later was rec-
ognized in two manners: by the lower depreciation deductions44 resulting
from the reduction in the bases of depreciable assets of an electing debtor,
and by the realization of a commensurately larger gain attributable to the
reduced bases accounts upon sales by the electing debtors of the downward
adjusted assets.45 The nonrecognition treatment of section 108, however,
was not available to the extent the debt cancelled or reduced exceeded the
basis of the debtor's property that could be adjusted.46
While the scope of section 108 differed according to the nature of the
taxpayer,47 the election procedure under section 108 was similar for all
transfer of property. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1954). In recent years,
however, various courts have held § 108 unavailable to gain realized from cancellation
transactions involving the transfer of property. See note 7 supra. In contrast, the Regula-
tions suggested a bifurcated approach to determine the application of § 108 to these transac-
tions. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(b)(5) (1960) (§ 108 applies to excess of debt over fair market
value of property; presumably difference between fair market value of property and its basis
will produce gain or loss). For a discussion of this concept, see Estate of Delman v. Com-
missioner, 73 T.C. 15, 31 n.6, 34 n.ll, 38 nn.16-18 (1979).
42. The language of § 108(l)(A) apparently extended the nonrecognition election under
§ 108 to any debt cancellation of a corporate debtor, assuming that the debt arose out of the
ordinary course or within the normal scope of such corporation's trade or business. I.R.C.
§ 108(l)(A) (1980). For instance, indebtedness for which the corporation is not liable as a
matter of law, e.g., a personal debt of an officer or director, probably would not be included
within the scope of this rule. Thus, a sufficient relationship between the debt and the corpo-
ration's trade or business was necessary.
43. Id § 108(l)(B).
44. I.R.C. § 167.
45. Debatable is whether a justification exists for conversion of § 61(a)(12) cancellation
of indebtedness income, which is ordinary income for want of a sale or exchange, into capi-
tal gain upon sale of a downward-adjusted § 1231(b) asset. Perhaps justification can be
premised on the notion that a financially sound taxpayer that reduces the bases of its assets
by ordinary depreciation deductions taken under I.R.C. § 167 later can sell such assets in
such a manner to reap long-term capital gains under I.R.C. § 1231, assuming the various
recapture pitfalls of section 1245 and 1250 are avoided. In effect, such a taxpayer can reap
the benefit of ordinary deductions at a tax cost of long-term capital gain rates with respect to
his § 1231(b) assets. Along the same line of reasoning, the financially distressed taxpayer
required to reduce the bases of its assets under §§ 108 and 1017 similarly avoided an ordi-
nary income event at a tradeoff of long-term capital gain upon the later disposition of the
adjusted asset. See Rev. Rul. 67-200, 1967-1 C.B. 15.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(a) (1960) provided that the reduction of basis shall not ex-
ceed the total available bases; no "negative bases" could result from a § 108/1017 transac-
tion. Moreover, to the extent that the debt discharge exceeded the basis reduction, an
amount had to be included in the gross income of the debtor electing § 108 treatment. Rev.
Rul. 70-406, 1970-2 C.B. 16. To the extent § 108 was inapplicable by reason of such an
excess, however, the debtor could rely on another exception to the cancellation of indebted-
ness income rule of Kirby Lumber. See text accompanying notes 16-37 supra.
47. Corporate and individual taxpayers could receive disparate treatment. The Regula-
tions provided that § 108 would apply to an individual debtor if the loan proceeds were used
to purchase, repair, or improve business property. Treas, Reg. § 1.108(a)-l(a)(2) (1960).
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taxpayers. Pursuant to the regulations under section 1017,48 a taxpayer
seeking nonrecognition treatment under section 108 was required to file a
formal consent for the taxable year within which the cancellation transac-
tion occurred. 49 The basis adjustment procedures under section 1017 uti-
lized in connection with a section 108 election provided a meticulous basis
reduction procedure, 50 which generally designated a specific order in
which the bases of the taxpayer's assets were to be reduced. The basis of
property to which the debt relates, i e., property acquired by the proceeds
of the discharged debt, was reduced first, excluding inventory and accounts
and notes receivable. The basis of property subject to a lien created by the
debt was reduced next, followed by any remaining property other than
inventory and accounts and notes receivable, and finally by inventory and
accounts and notes receivable. 5 ' From a timing viewpoint, the adjustment
was made as of the first day of the taxable year in which the cancellation
event occurred, unless the properties so adjusted were acquired at a later
date during such year, in which event the adjustment was made as of the
acquisition date. 52
More importantly, if the basis adjustment exceeded the available aggre-
gate bases of property held by the debtor, such excess had to be recognized
The key focus was the use to which the proceeds were put rather than the presence or char-
acter of any security for the loan.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-2(b) (1960).
49. In the event the debtor had several cancellations of indebtedness during the taxable
year, it could file the § 108 consent "piecemeal" by making the election on a property-by-
property basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(c), example (a) (1960). Alternatively, a debtor con-
ceivably could bifurcate a single cancellation of indebtedness transaction into recognition
and nonrecognition events. A § 108 consent could be filed in an amended return only in
special cases. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-2 (1960). The definition underlying the phrase "special
cases," however, was unclear. A "special case" seemingly would involve reasonable cause
for the taxpayer's failure to file the consent with his original return. Id. § 1.108(a)-2. A
hindsight determination approach, by which the taxpayer assesses the desirability of a basis
adjustment after the fact, would not appear to qualify as sufficient reasonable cause. Co-
lumbia Gas Sys., Inc. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d
1244 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Denmar Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 261,
264 (6th Cir. 1951) (taxpayer can change election only if original election was in error).
The consent under § 108 was to be made on Form 982. Schedule B of Form 982 had to
contain a complete description of the debt cancellation transaction to which the consent
applies. Strict adherence to Form 982 was not always required, however. See, e.g., Ambas-
sador Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 163 (1954), acq. 1956-1 C.B. 3. In the event the
debt cancellation transaction overlapped two taxable years, a new consent had to be filed for
each taxable period. In addition, the Service ruled that a partnership could file a consent
under § 108. Rev. Rul. 72-205, 1972-1 C.B. 37. Under I.R.C. § 752, however, the amount of
income excluded by § 108 would reduce the basis of each partner's interest in the partner-
ship. For a discussion of the effect of cancellation of indebtedness in a partnership context,
see W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMORE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 9.06 (1977).
50. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1017-1(a)(l) to (6) (1960). After reduction of purchase money in-
debtedness, the Regulations required basis reduction to be applied first against depreciable
or wasting assets in certain specified categories. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(b)(7) (1960).
51. In the case of an individual debtor, two other categories were included for basis
reduction purposes: investment property and "all other" property. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1017-
1(a)(5), (6) (1960).
52. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1017-1(b)(4)(i), (ii) (1960). The § 1017 adjustment was made rata-
bly with respect to all property in each of the above stated groups, in proportion to their
respective adjusted bases. Id § 1.1017-1(b)(4).
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as gross income.53 Additionally, the Service had taken the position that a
reduction in the basis of the debtor's assets pursuant to sections 108 and
1017 with respect to "qualified investment credit property" was a pro tanto
"disposition" of such property54 measured by the basis so reduced, result-
ing in partial recapture of the investment tax credit allowed upon the
purchase of the adjusted property. 55 Prior to passage of the Act, the effect
of sections 108 and 1017 with respect to an electing corporation's earnings
and profits also was unclear.56
C The Interrelationship of Cancellation of Indebtedness and Net
Operating Losses
The interrelationship between the exceptions from the realization of
cancellation of indebtedness income and the availability of net operating
loss carryovers is unclear. The Service originally maintained that the net
operating loss carryovers57 generated by a taxpayer were not affected by
the tax results of a subsequent cancellation of indebtedness in either an
insolvency or bankruptcy setting.5 Under this view an insolvent debtor
corporation or one undergoing bankruptcy proceedings conceivably could
reap the benefits of nonrecognition of cancellation of indebtedness income,
while simultaneously surviving the insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding
with a net operating loss carryover against which the post-bankruptcy or
post-insolvency taxable income of the rehabilitated business possibly could
be offset. 59 As long as the corporate debtor fell within either an exception
53. Rev. Rul. 70-406, 1970-2 C.B. 16. When the debtor transfers property in cancella-
tion of an outstanding debt, the tax results are far from certain. See notes 7, 41 supra. The
Regulations treated the transfer as one to which §§ 108 and 1017 applied to the extent that
the cancelled debt exceeded the fair market value of the property transferred. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.10 17-1(b)(5) (1960). See also note 46 supra. This approach is a far leap from universal
acceptance. See notes 7, 41 supra.
54. Rev. Rul. 74-184, 1974-1 C.B. 8. The Service, however, apparently will not main-
tain the position that basis reduction causes depreciation recapture. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-
l(b) (1960).
55. See I.R.C. § 47; Treas. Reg. § 1.47-2(c) (1967).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b) (1960) implicitly provides that even if § 108 was elected,
earnings and profits increased by the amounts subject to such election. In Meyer v. Com-
missioner, 383 F.2d 883, 891 (8th Cir. 1967), however, the court held that earnings and
profits are not created by the discharge of indebtedness under the Bankruptcy Act. The
Service has announced that it will not follow the Meyer decision to the extent that the
amount of debt discharged exceeds the reduction in basis of the taxpayer's assets. Rev. Rul.
75-515, 1975-2 C.B. 117.
57. I.R.C. § 172(b).
58. Rev. Rul. 58-600, 1958-2 C.B. 29 (cancellation of indebtedess income not recognized
due to application of insolvency exception to the Kirby Lumber rule). See also A.L. Davis v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 814, 833 (1978) (discharge in bankruptcy of individual debtors did
not preclude carryover of net operating losses sustained both before and during bankruptcy;
moreover, discharge of indebtedness had no effect on such loss carryovers).
59. In the event such corporate debtors were insolvent, the insolvency exception of Dal-
las Transfer would apply. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra. On the other hand, if
such corporate debtor were undergoing a chapter X or XI proceeding, §§ 268 and 270 of the
Bankruptcy Act would shield the taxpayer from recognition of cancellation of indebtedness
income, subject to certain adjustments. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, §§ 268,
270, 52 Stat. 840, 904 (repealed 1978); see note 28 supra.
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to Kirby Lumber60 or the Bankruptcy Act,6 1 or elected the nonrecognition
provisions of section 108,62 its net operating loss generally would carry
over to future taxable years. 63
This circumstance provided a key tax planning tool in the bankruptcy
and insolvency area if the corporate debtor with substantial net operating
loss carryovers incurs cancellation of indebtedness. The corporate debtor
could avoid the recognition of income resulting from the cancellation of
indebtedness in several ways: by relying on exceptions to the Kirby Lum-
ber rule, by falling under the nonrecognition rule of the Bankruptcy Act,
or by electing to reduce the bases of its assets under section 108. Having
reaped the benefit of the cancellation of indebtedness, the debtor then
could revamp its operations and later use those loss carryovers whose un-
derlying debts had been cancelled without resulting in a taxable event.
For example, the corporate debtor could sell its stock or merge into a prof-
itable corporation, whereby the acquiring company would purchase the
stock or assets of the bankrupt or insolvent corporation for a significant
purpose64 of reaping a dollar-for-dollar benefit from the debtor corpora-
tion's net operating loss carryover. The former shareholders of the ac-
quired corporation would receive an amount of stock of the acquiring
corporation adequate to avoid any section 382 problems. Moreover, the
purchase price for the debtor corporation's assets or stock presumably
would be based on the fair market value of the corporation's net assets,
adjusted by several factors. Although early attacks on this type of transac-
tion by the Service were successful, in recent years the success of the Serv-
ice has been diminished.65
60. See text accompanying notes 16-37 supra.
61. See note 28 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 38-56 supra.
63. Because this conclusion assumes no change of ownership, the limitation provisions
of I.R.C. § 382 are not applicable. Similarly, potential problems under id § 269 and limita-
tions imposed by the consolidated return regulations are assumed to be inapplicable.
64. Section 269 problems may arise if theprimary purpose of the acquiring corporation
is to obtain net operating loss carryover advantages.
65. Early cases agreeing with the Service included Willingham v. United States, 289
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961) (losses incurred by corporate taxpayer for two years prior to its
reorganization in bankruptcy, under a plan that in effect wiped out such losses, not available
to carry over and deduct from income generated by the post-bankruptcy corporation, even
though the latter corporation continued to engage in substantially the same business), and
Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 990 (1947), aff'd inpart and rev'd in
part, 173 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1949) (corporation consented to liquidation and dissolution
pursuant to resolutions of stockholders and board of directors, ceased production and sold
the bulk of its operating property; corporation not entitled to carry back unused property tax
credits to a prior year).
In recent years judicial sentiment has shifted with respect to the utilization of net operat-
ing loss carryovers after the loss corporation has undergone bankruptcy reorganization. Re-
cent taxpayer victories include Daytona Beach Kennel Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
1015 (1978) (de facto dissolution doctrine rejected in determining whether a reorganization
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act extinguished the bankrupt corporation's net operating loss
carryover); Jacqueline, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1977); Jackson Olds-
mobile, Inc. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1964) (refusing to apply de facto
dissolution doctrine in net operating loss situation), aff'd, 371 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1967). See
also Technical Advice Memorandum No. 8014009, IRS Letter Rul. (CCH) (Dec. 17, 1979).
For further discussion of this concept, see Glancy, Carrying Losses Through Chapter X and
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The application of this concept can be explained more fully as follows.
Assume a corporate debtor has reorganized in a bankruptcy case, surviv-
ing the proceedings with potential pre-bankruptcy net operating loss carry-
overs. In recent years the Service has unsuccessfully argued that such a
debtor has undergone a de facto dissolution,66 and that all corporate tax
attributes, including net operating loss carryovers, therefore "die." More-
over, assuming the acquiring corporation avoids certain statutory weapons
and the "evil purpose" weapon available to the Service, 67 it may gain the
full benefit of the corporate debtor's net operating loss carryovers. Thus,
the corporate debtor escapes income and its net operating loss carryovers
survive the transaction, even though several of the cancelled liabilities that
created deductible expenditures, which in turn generated the debtor's net
operating loss carryovers, are wiped clean. Every dollar of cancelled lia-
bility essentially gives the corporate debtor two distinct economic benefits:
an initial benefit with respect to the cancelled loan 68 and an additional
benefit to both the debtor corporation and any acquiring company that
purchases the debtor corporation in a transaction in which the debtor's loss
carryover survives. It has been argued that giving such debtor the benefit
of the cancelled debt and the loss carryover from the cancelled debt may
confer a double benefit.69
A portion, or perhaps all, of the cancelled debt may have no nexus or
relationship to the deductions giving rise to the loss carryover. When a
corporate debtor is deprived of the use of its net operating loss carryover,
however, and such debtor is undergoing a bankruptcy or insolvency reor-
ganization proceeding, the cash savings resulting from the loss carryover
generally will benefit the corporation's creditors rather than the corpora-
tion itself. Finally, the Service has ruled that a debtor's loss carryovers are
not affected in an insolvency proceeding. 70
XI Reorganizations, 28 TAx LAW. 27 (1974); Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Com-
mission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Reorganizations, Carryovers and the Effects of Debt Reduc-
tion, 29 TAx L. REV. 229 (1974).
66. See note 65 supra.
67. I.R.C. §§ 382, 269; see note 63 supra.
68. The cancelled loan may confer economic benefit upon the debtor by offsetting other
income, as in the case of a deductible expense resulting from the cancelled debt, or in the
form of cash, as in the case of proceeds derived from the loan.
69. This loss carryover may be available to the acquiring corporation dollar-for-dollar,
even though that corporation paid for or funded only a percentage of the net tax benefit of
the loss carryover. Every dollar of the cancelled liability of the debtor corporation, which
incurred the loss, nonetheless contributed to the total dollar amount of the loss carryover,
assuming each dollar of liability gave rise to a dollar of deduction. Because the cancellation
of these loss-generating liabilities did not affect the debtor corporation's total loss carryover,
and because the acquiring corporation paid the debtor corporation an amount for its stock
based on the tax value of the loss carryover less an amount to reflect the discounted net tax
benefit of the loss and the attendant economic risks inherent in the debtor corporation's
business, the acquiring corporation will derive a net tax benefit from the loss carryover for
which it paid, in dollar terms, a substantial discount in relationship to the total net tax dollar
amount of the loss carryover.
70. Rev. Rul. 58-600, 1958-2 C.B. 29.
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I1. THE BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1980:71 GENERAL SUMMARY
According to the report of the House Ways and Means Committee, 72 the
71. Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389. The effective date provisions of the Act should be
noted carefully. Generally, Jan. 1, 1981, is the effective date for the application of the ma-
jority of the Act's provisions: general discharge of indebtedness and corporate reorganiza-
tions and other corporate amendments. Id §§ 7(a), (c), (d). With respect to individual
bankruptcies, the effective date of the Act's tax provisions is Mar. 24, 1981. Id § 7(b). The
provisions of the Act dealing with tax procedure, however, are retroactive to Oct. 1, 1979,
which is the effective date of the new Bankruptcy Code. Id § 7(e).
A special transitional rule will delay the effective date of attribute reduction until Jan. 1,
1982. Id § 7(a)(2). In a bankruptcy case or similar judicial proceeding taxpayers may, sub-
ject to court approval, elect on an "all or nothing" basis to apply the provisions of the Act
dealing with tax treatment of discharge of indebtedness, corporate reorganizations, and mis-
cellaneous corporate changes retroactively to Oct. 1, 1979. Id. § 7(0). This twist is due to an
earlier draft version of the Act, which had used Oct. I, 1979, as the effective date.
Pursuant to this special election, a debtor in a bankruptcy case or similar judicial proceed-
ing may, with the approval of the court, elect to apply "certain provisions" of the Act as of
Oct. 1, 1979. Id. These "provisions" include the Act's rules relating to tax treatment of
discharge of indebtedness; however, due to the special transitional rules set forth in § 7(a)(2)
of the Act, "attribute reduction" is delayed to apply to bankruptcy cases that commence
after Jan. 1, 1982. Essentially, this special election permits a debtor whose bankruptcy case
commenced between Oct. 1, 1979, and Jan. 1, 1981, to elect to apply the Act retroactively,
presumably on the theory that such a debtor structured its bankruptcy case on the premise
that the Act would be ultimately enacted in its present form with the originally suggested
Oct. 1, 1979, effective date. It appears that a debtor taking advantage of this special election
will be required to apply the amount of debt discharged as a result of the bankruptcy case to
reduce its basis in its assets (but not below fair market value), and any amount of debt
discharge remaining after the reduction of the basis of the debtor's assets will not be in-
cluded m income or cause a reduction of net operating loss carryovers or other tax attributes
(as will be the case after Jan. 1, 1982).
Temporary regulations have been promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury dealing
with this special election procedure. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7a.3. The regulations state that
the effect of the special election is to change the effective date of certain amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as made by the Act, including the provisions mentioned
above. Id. § 7a.3.(c)(i). More importantly, the temporary regulations make it clear that the
special election takes into account the special transitional rule that, as described above, de-
lays the effective date of attribute reduction until bankruptcy cases commencing on or after
Jan. I, 1982. Id. § 7a.3.(c)(3).
According to these temporary regulations, a debtor in a bankruptcy case makes the special
election by doing the following:
1. The debtor must file a written statement containing the name, address,
and taxpayer identification number of the debtor, a statement that the debtor
is making the election under § 7() of the Act, and information (including the
date of commencement) sufficient to identify the bankruptcy case or similar
proceeding. This written statement must be signed by the debtor or a person
duly authorized to sign the income tax return of the debtor.
2. The debtor must file evidence of court approval of this special election
which, according to the regulations, must be a copy of an order or other docu-
ment properly signed by the judge or officer presiding over the bankruptcy
case. In addition to information identifying the debtor in the case or proceed-
ing over which the officer presides, the order must state that the court ap-
proves the election of the debtor under § 7(f) of the Act.
3. The written statement and evidence of court approval must be filed on
or before Nov. 2, 1981, with the District Director or the Director of Internal
Revenue Service Center with whom an income tax return for the debtor would
be filed if it were due on the date the election is filed.
4. The election shall be considered to be made on the date in which the
written statement and evidence of court approval is filed.
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debt discharge rules of the Act seek to "accommodate bankruptcy policy
and tax policy" so as to "preserve the debtor's fresh start after bank-
ruptcy."7 3 To accomplish this goal, the Act seeks to ensure that a debtor
that undergoes a bankruptcy case or an insolvency proceeding is not "bur-
dened with an immediate tax liability."'74
The Act generally provides that in either bankruptcy or insolvency
cases, the debtor's gross income does not include amounts that otherwise
would constitute cancellation of indebtedness income. This amount is
termed the "debt discharge amount. 75 The tax cost of avoiding the inclu-
sion of the debt discharge amount in the debtor's gross income is the re-
duction of the debtor's net operating losses and certain other tax attributes
("attribute reduction") by an amount equal to the debt discharge amount,
unless the bankrupt or insolvent debtor first makes an election to reduce
the bases of its depreciable assets.76 With respect to solvent debtors
outside of bankruptcy, the Act modifies the section 108 election by narrow-
ing nonrecognition relief to such debtors; nonrecognition is available only
in those instances when an election to reduce the bases of depreciable as-
sets is made.77 The Legislative Reports indicate that the attribute reduc-
tion provisions of the Act will give the debtor flexibility in accounting for
any debt discharge amount in the manner most favorable to its particular
tax situation.78 The Reports further note that the attribute reduction
method purportedly will avoid a permanent deferral that, according to the
Legislative Reports, can be accomplished under present law.7 9 The legis-
lative history states that attribute reduction will carry out the congressional
5. Finally, the debtor should attach a copy of the written statement and
evidence of court approval to the next income tax return filed on or after the
date the election is made.
72. H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Committee
Report]. S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. N~ws 7017 [hereinafter cited as Senate Finance Report] adopted the House Report in
substantially the same form, except for certain changes as discussed herein. Collectively, the
House and Senate Reports are referred to hereinafter as the Legislative Reports.
73. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 8-9; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
9-10. The preservation of the debtor's "fresh start" after bankruptcy is in lieu of permitting
the debtor to have what was referred to in the committee hearings as a "head start." The
latter concept refers to the ability of a debtor to avoid cancellation of indebtedness income
while avoiding any limiting effect on its net operating loss carryovers. This circumstance
was deemed to constitute a "head start." See BNA Daily Tax Report No. 213 (Nov. 1,
1979). For a discussion of this concept, see text accompanying notes 57-70 supra.
74. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 9; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 10.
75. I.R.C. § 108(a)(l).
76. Id § 108(b)(5).
77. Id §§ 108(c), (d)(4).
78. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 9; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 10.
79. Id The Committee Report's concern with permanent deferral seems somewhat un-
justified on careful examination of§ 1017 in conjunction with § 108. A so-called permanent
deferral seems unlikely, because as a general rule the basis of certain depreciable assets first
must be reduced when § 108 is elected. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(b)(7) (1960). Hence, smaller
depreciation deductions may be taken, and such assets will result in a commensurately
larger gain when ultimately sold. See note 45 supra. If the corporate debtor has no depre-
ciable assets, however, but only nondepreciable assets, such as stock in a subsidiary, the
possibilities of a permanent deferral increase.
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intent of "deferring, but eventually collecting within a reasonable period,
tax on ordinary income realized from debt discharge."80 To ensure that
the postponed cancellation of indebtedness income eventually is recog-
nized as ordinary income, the Act provides a corollary ordinary income
recapture rule with respect to the sale of those depreciable assets whose
bases are reduced under the special election, the sale of which otherwise
would result in long-term capital gain.81
The debt discharge provisions of the Act not only contain many techni-
cal problems, but are replete with policy ramifications contrary to the well-
intended but ill-conceived and poorly engineered intent of the Act to "ac-
commodate bankruptcy law and tax law." To provide a better under-
standing of the technical aspects of the debt discharge rules under the Act,
the remainder of this Article contains a technical discussion of the statu-
tory provisions of the Act, primarily focusing on their impact on the corpo-
rate debtor. Critical comments from both theoretical and pragmatic tax
viewpoints are highlighted. Throughout the course of this analysis several
policy considerations are raised from both tax and bankruptcy viewpoints.
Finally, the summary portion of this Article makes certain recommenda-
tions as to the desirability and nature of future amendments to the Act.82
IV. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ACT: THE DEBT
DISCHARGE PROVISIONS
4. Debt Discharge of Debtors in Title 11 and Insolvency Cases
Pursuant to new section 108(a)(1), gross income does not include any
amount that otherwise would be includable in gross income by reason of a
discharge of indebtedness of the debtor, so long as the discharge occurs in
a bankruptcy case or when the debtor is insolvent. The toll charge for this
deceptively labeled exclusion83 from gross income is that the debt dis-
charge amount first will be applied to reduce certain tax attributes of the
debtor.84 As an alternative to attribute reduction, the debtor can elect to
first reduce its bases in its depreciable assets.85 According to the Legisla-
tive Reports, any debt discharge amount remaining after attribute reduc-
tion is disregarded in bankruptcy or insolvency cases.8 6
80. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 9; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 10.
81. I.R.C. § 1017(d).
82. Because the attribute reduction provisions of the Act do not become effective until
January 1, 1982, the authors hope that remedial legislative action can be taken to amend the
debt discharge rules before they become effective. See Part IX infra. For a discussion of the
effective date provisions of the Act, see note 71 supra.
83. Arguably, the statutory language used by new § 108, which implies that the debt
discharge amount is "excluded" from gross income, should require no basis adjustments, as
is typical for a true exclusion from gross income.
84. I.R.C. § 108(b).
85. Id § 108(b)(5).
86. Compare Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 13 (any debt discharge amount
"left after attribute reduction. . . is disregarded, i.e., does not result in income or have other
tax consequences") with Rev. Rul. 70-406, 1970-2 C.B. 16 (if debt discharge amount exceeds
basis of debtor's assets, excess must be included in gross income when debtor is solvent and
not a party to a bankruptcy proceeding). Under prior law, however, even if an excess debt
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A corporate debtor undergoing a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding
and seeking shelter under proposed section 108(a)(1)(A) first must inquire
as to the meaning of a "title 11 case." The Legislative Reports define the
term "bankruptcy case" as a case under title 11 of the United States Code,
but only if the debtor is under the jurisdiction of the court in the case and
the discharge of indebtedness is granted by or pursuant to a plan granted
by the court.8 7 For purposes of satisfying the "insolvency" exception, 88 the
Act defines insolvency as the excess of the debtor's liabilities over the fair
market value of its assets, as determined immediately before the debt dis-
charge.89 The chore of determining the fair market value of a taxpayer's
assets will be a difficult one and, as has been true in related areas requiring
such a determination, a litigation-breeding endeavor. 90
Assuming the debtor falls within either the bankruptcy or the insolvency
classification,9' and does not elect to reduce the bases of its depreciable
assets by the debt discharge amount,92 the ordering rules of attribution
reduction come into play. Pursuant to new section 108(b), the amount to
be excluded from gross income by reason of a debt discharge in a bank-
ruptcy or an insolvency case will reduce the debtor's tax attributes in the
following order: (1) any net operating loss of the taxable year in which the
discharge occurs and net operating loss carryovers to such taxable year; (2)
carryovers to or from the taxable year of discharge of the investment tax
credit (other than the ESOP credit), the WIN credit, the new jobs credit,
discharge amount remained after basis reduction pursuant to § 1017, such excess generally
could be shielded from taxation by another exception to § 61(a)(12), e.g., the insolvency
exception. Whether the results under the new § 108 similarly would apply to discharge of
indebtedness outside of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings is unclear, but the answer
appears to be negative. Because the solvent taxpayer has the necessary funds to pay the tax
resulting from the recognition of cancellation of indebtedness income, the justification for
nonrecognition in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings does not apply in the solvency situ-
ation. The Senate Finance Report therefore states that such excess constitutes § 61(a)(12)
gross income. Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 16.
87. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 10 n.I 1; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72,
at 12 n.l1.
88. I.R.C. § 108(a)(l)(B).
89. Id § 108(d)(3). Section 108 provides that no other insolvency exception will apply
except the provision as set forth therein. Id § 108(e)(1). Thus, the clear intent and plain
language of the statute appears to be that in the event a case fails to qualify under the
§ 108(a)(l)(B) insolvency exception, the judicial approach to the insolvency exception will
be unavailable. For a discussion of the judicially created insolvency exception, see text ac-
companying notes 16-18 supra.
90. The determination of fair market value in the federal income tax arena has been
complex; it invariably is resolved by examining a multitude of facts and circumstances. See,
e.g., Davis v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 814 (1978). In light of these factual difficulties, the
insolvency exception as contained in the Act not surprisingly has been highly criticized,
from both tax and bankruptcy viewpoints. See Part IX infra. Moreover, the determination
of insolvency seems not to include exempt assets or those assets lacking a reasonable ascer-
tainable value. See Davis v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 814 (1978); note 16 supra. The statute
and Legislative Reports are silent on this point, however. I.R.C. § 1017(c)(1) does provide
that an amount excluded from gross income under § 108(a)(l)(A) will not result in the re-
duction in basis of the property treated by the debtor as exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522
(Supp. III 1979).
91. I.R.C. §§ 108(a)(I)(A)-(B).
92. Id § 108(b)(5).
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and the credit for alcohol used as fuel; (3) net capital losses for the taxable
year of discharge and capital loss carryovers to such taxable year; (4) the
bases of the taxpayer's depreciable and nondepreciable assets (as guided by
new section 1017); and (5) foreign tax credit carryovers. 93
The reduction of attributes in each of the foregoing categories is made in
the order of the taxable years in which the item would be consumed.94 In
addition, such order is determined as if the debt discharge amount were
not excluded from the debtor's gross income, and any limitations on the
use of credits that are based on the debtor's gross income are to be disre-
garded. 95 Furthermore, the credits in categories (2) and (5) above are re-
duced at a rate of fifty percent of each dollar of debt discharge amount, in
order to avoid the complexity of what otherwise would require the work-
ings of a simultaneous equation. 96
In lieu of the attribute reduction scenario, the debtor in a bankruptcy
case or insolvent debtor may elect to reduce the bases of its depreciable
assets, 97 although not below zero.98 As new section 108(b)(5)(C) and the
93. Id §§ 108(b)(2)(A)-(E).
94. Id §§ 108(b)(4)(A)-(C). Accordingly, in the case of net operating basis or capital
losses, the debt discharge amount first would reduce the current year's loss and then would
reduce remaining loss carryovers in the taxable year in which they arose. Id § 108(b)(4)(B).
On the other hand, investment tax credits are to be reduced on a first-in, first-out basis, and
other credit carryovers are reduced in the order in which they would be used to offset taxable
income. Id § 108(b)(4)(C). See Committee Report, supra note 72, at 10 n.13; Senate Fi-
nance Report, supra note 72, at 13 n. 13. These reductions are made after computation of the
tax for the current taxable year. I.R.C. § 108(b)(4)(A).
The basis reduction under category (4) is limited by the difference between the aggregate
of the bases of property held by the taxpayer immediately after the discharge over the aggre-
gate of the taxpayer's liabilities immediately after the discharge. Id § 1017(b)(2). This limi-
tation will not apply when the debtor makes the § 108(b)(5) election. Id Temporary
regulations prescribing the time and manner for making the various elections under the Act
were recently issued by the Service. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017, T.D. 7775, 46 Fed. Reg.
25,291 (May 6, 1981).
95. 1.R.C. § 1017(b)(2).
96. Id § 108(b)(3)(B). Reductions of net operating losses and capital losses are on a
dollar-for-dollar basis, however. Id § 108(b)(3)(A).
97. Id § 108(b)(5). The Legislative Reports define depreciable property as any prop-
erty of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation, but only if the basis reduction
will reduce the amount of depreciation or amortization otherwise allowable for the period
immediately following such reduction. For example, a lessor could not reduce the basis of
leased property when the lessee's obligation in respect of the property will restore to the
lessor the loss due to depreciation during the leasehold term, because during that term the
lessor is prohibited from claiming depreciation with respect to such property. Committee
Report, supra note 72, at II n. 14; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 13 n. 14 (citing
Kern v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 455 (1968), aft'd, 432 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1970)). Section
108(d)(5) defines depreciable property as having the same meaning as that used in § 1017,
which adopts the definition as found in the legislative history. I.R.C. § 1017(b)(3)(B). The
Act expands the definition of depreciable property in two other instances. First, the debtor
can elect to treat as depreciable property real property that is inventory within the meaning
of § 1221(1). Id § 1017(b)(3)(E). Secondly, stock of a subsidiary held by a debtor parent
corporation can be treated as depreciable property if such corporations are members of the
same affiliated group, which files a consolidated return for the taxable year in which the
discharge occurs. Id. § 1017(b)(3)(D).
98. I.R.C. § 108(b)(5)(B) states that the "amount to which an election... applies shall
not exceed the aggregate adjusted bases of the depreciable property held by the taxpayer as
of the beginning of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the discharge oc-
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underlying legislative history imply, the basis reduction election can be
made on an all-or-nothing or piecemeal basis.99 For example, assume a
corporate debtor's debt discharge amount is $100, its only new section
108(b)(2) attribute is a net operating loss carryover of $80, and the aggre-
gate adjusted bases of its depreciable property also are $80. To maximize
preservation of its net operating loss carryover, the corporate debtor
should elect to reduce the basis of depreciable assets. If, on the other hand,
the corporate debtor does not anticipate the generation of taxable income
within the carryover period against which the net operating loss carryover
could be offset,' °° it should permit the automatic attribute reduction to
apply.' 0 ' If, however, the corporate debtor projects the generation of only
$50 of taxable income within the loss carryover period, it should make a
partial election to reduce the basis of depreciable assets by an amount
equal to $70. This would permit the corporate debtor to use fully its antic-
ipated loss carryover ($50) as determined by the amount of the anticipated
stream of taxable income in the loss carryover period. 10 2
From a procedural viewpoint, the election first to reduce basis in depre-
ciable assets is made on the taxpayer's return for the year in which the debt
discharge occurs.' 0 3 A significant procedural trap is that an electing tax-
payer may revoke this election only with the consent of the Secretary of
the Treasury.' 4 Thus, the electing taxpayer must have full knowledge of
both the legal and factual aspects of a given debt discharge situation. Al-
though the legislative history is silent on this point, the consent of the Sec-
retary presumably will be based on reasonable cause, perhaps either some
good business reason or a factual ignorance situation. 0 5 Still unclear is
whether a taxpayer making the election could amend its return to with-
draw the consent in a later taxable year, if not barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. 106
To ensure that the deferred debt discharge amount eventually is taxed as
ordinary income, 10 7 the Act provides a special recapture rule.'0 8 Pursuant
curs." Thus, in the event the debt discharge amount exceeds the debtor's aggregate adjusted
bases, such excess presumably could not be subject to depreciable basis reduction but would
be required to undergo attribute reduction. If that avenue is not available, it apparently
would be "disregarded" in title 11 or insolvent cases, which presumably means nonrecog-
nized. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
99. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 11; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
12.
100. I.R.C. § 172(b).
101. Id § 108(b)(l)(A).
102. Use of a partial depreciable basis election with attribute reduction ostensibly is per-
mitted by the phrase "any portion" in § 108(b)(5)(A) and the language contained in the
legislative history. See note 100 upra.
103. I.R.C. § 108(d)(8)(A). Apparently some leeway exists in the manner by which the
election is made, insofar as the Secretary is instructed by the Act to promulgate regulations
setting forth other methods of making the election.
104. Id § 108(d)(8)(B).
105. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
106. See I.R.C. § 6511.
107. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 9; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 11.
108. I.R.C. § 1017(d); see Committee Report, supra note 72, at 11; Senate Finance Re-
port, supra note 72, at 14.
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to this rule, any gain realized on the subsequent disposition of property to
which the basis reduction rule has been applied, whether depreciable or
nondepreciable, 0 9 will be subject to recapture provisions similar to those
under sections 1245 and 1250.110 Certain other aspects of the Act's debt
discharge rules also should be examined. First, the downward adjustment
of the bases of depreciable assets generally will accord with present treas-
ury regulations that apply to basis reduction."' The Act provides that the
basis reduction in a given case will take effect on the first day of the taxa-
ble year following the year in which the discharge of indebtedness takes
place.112
B. Debt Discharge of Solvent Debtors Outside of Bankruptcy
Perhaps the most controversial provisions of the Act are those dealing
with solvent debtors outside of bankruptcy. This controversy emanates
from the primary congressional concern "to accommodate bankruptcy pol-
icy and tax policy," which seemingly has little relationship to financially
able debtors.' '3 The Legislative Reports, however, comment that discount
purchases in the open market by a solvent corporate debtor of its own
securities or bonds without the recognition of cancellation of indebtedness
income are undesirable; the basis reduction provisions of section 108 pre-
sumably can be used in such a manner as to cause a permanent deferral of
income of the debt discharge amount.' "4 Consequently, the Act will have
a significant impact on taxpayers outside of bankruptcy or insolvency
cases. ' 15
Initially, the general rule regarding solvent debtors seems favorable: it
simply states that gross income shall not include debt discharge amounts
that relate to "qualified business indebtedness." '" 6 The latter phrase is de-
fined, in a manner reminiscent of old section 108, as indebtedness incurred
or assumed by a corporation or by an individual in connection with prop-
109. I.R.C. § 1017(d); see Committee Report, supra note 72, at 11; Senate Finance Re-
port, supra note 72, at 14.
110. Section 1017(d)(l)(B) treats any reduction under new § 108 as a depreciation deduc-
tion; hence, the entire amount of a basis adjustment will be subject to recapture treatment,
except in the case of real property using the straight-line depreciation method. I.R.C.
§ 1017(d)(2).
I11. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 11; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
12.
112. I.R.C. § 108(b)(5)(B).
113. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 8-9; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
10-11.
114. For example, a corporate debtor buys its outstanding bonds at less than face value.
The debtor then reduces the basis of its factory or a subsidiary it does not intend to sell. The
debtor effectively has deferred permanently the gain upon purchase of the bonds for less
than face value. See Committee Report, supra note 72, at 9; Senate Finance Report, supra
note 72, at 10.
115. The fiscal aspects of the Act are highly suspect when one weighs the meager increase
in tax revenue of the solvent taxpayer provisions ($5,000,000) against the taxpayer cost re-
sulting from the added legal and accounting complexity in addressing these new provisions.
Perhaps more importantly, the revenue raising aspects of the Act with respect to title I I and
insolvent taxpayers are uncertain. See Committee Report, supra note 72, at 49.
116. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(C).
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erty used in his trade or business.' 17 The Act provides, however, that the
debt discharge amount attributable to qualified business indebtedness shall
be applied to reduce the bases of the solvent taxpayer's depreciable as-
sets1 18 The proper measuring rod for determining the available deprecia-
ble property to which the reduction rule can apply is the aggregate
adjusted bases of such property held by the taxpayer as of the beginning of
the taxable year following the taxable year in which the discharge oc-
curs. 1 9 If the debt discharge amount exceeds the aggregate bases of the
taxpayer's depreciable property, however, contrary to the result in a title 11
or insolvency case, such excess will result in the recognition of cancellation
of indebtedness income to the solvent taxpayer.' 20 The recapture rule ap-
plicable to bankruptcy or insolvency cases similarly applies to solvent tax-
payers upon the disposition of depreciable property to which the basis
reduction rules have been applied.' 2 1 If an insolvent taxpayer not in-
volved in a bankruptcy reorganization experiences a discharge of indebt-
edness, the attribute reduction and insolvency rules will not apply to the
extent such discharge renders the taxpayer solvent.' 22 In this instance the
taxpayer becomes subject to the rules concerning debt discharge amounts
involving qualified business indebtedness.'
23
C The Purchase Price Reduction Exception
The Act codifies with expansive and liberal language the judicially cre-
ated "purchase price reduction" exception 24 to the Kirby Lumber rule.' 25
In the case of solvent taxpayers, only the reduction of a purchase money
debt of a purchaser-debtor that "arose out of" the sale of property by the
seller to the purchaser will not be treated as income to the purchaser from
the discharge of indebtedness; rather, such reduction will be treated as
mere purchase price adjustment.' 26 The language employed by the statute
appears to liberally expand the exception to apply to any debt that "arose
out of' the purchase transaction.' 27 Thus, the debt arising out of the
purchase transaction seemingly need not be secured by the property that is
the subject matter of the sale.
117. Id § 108(d)(4).
118. Id § 108(c)(1)(A). This section cross-references to id § 1017 to determine the re-
duction of depreciable basis. While the statutory language of id. § 108(a)(l)(C) appears to
mandate a reduction, the Legislative Reports indicate that this reduction is "elective." Com-
mittee Report, supra note 72, at 12; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 15. See also
I.R.C. § 108(d)(8)(A).
119. I.R.C. § 108(c)(2).
120. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 14; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
15. For discussion of the result under a title 11 or insolvency case, see text accompanying
note 86 supra.
121. I.R.C. § 1017(d). See also Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 16.
122. I.R.C. § 108(a)(3).
123. Id § 108(a)(l)(C).
124. See text accompanying notes 118-23 supra.
125. I.R.C. § 108(e)(5).
126. Id




The codified version of the purchase price reduction exception is in-
tended to eliminate taxpayer controversy as to whether a debt reduction
should be treated as discharge income or a mere purchase price adjust-
ment.' 28 Moreover, if the purchase money debt has been transferred by
the debtor to a third party, whether or not related to the seller, the excep-
tion is inapplicable. 29 The exception will not apply to situations in which
the purchase money debt is reduced due to factors not involving direct
agreements between the buyer and seller, e.g., the tolling of the statute of
limitations on the enforcement of the obligation.' 30
D. Issuance of Stock by the Corporate Debtor in Satisfaction of
Corporate Debt
Under prior law the transfer by a corporate debtor of its stock in satis-
faction of its outstanding indebtedness did not result in gain or loss to such
corporation, ' 3' even if the fair market value of the stock so transferred was
less than the principal amount of the retired debt.' 32 Subject to certain
narrow exceptions, the Act does not change this judicially created excep-
tion to the Kirby Lumber rule. 133 Accordingly, subject to certain excep-
tions, under the Act no debt discharge amount will result from satisfaction
of corporate indebtedness by the issuance of stock of the corporate debtor,
even if such stock has a fair market value less than the amount of the
cancelled indebtedness. The classification of the corporate indebtedness as
a security for tax purposes will be irrelevant for purposes of applying this
rule. 134
Two exceptions to the codified stock-for-debt exception exist. Pursuant
128. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 13; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
16.
129. Id
130. Id This result comports with case law regarding the purchase price reduction
exception.
131. I.R.C. § 1032; see text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
132. Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1946); Capento Sec.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944). See also text accompanying notes 28-
31 supra.
133. Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 17.
134. Id An earlier draft of the Act would have reversed the stock-for-debt exception,
contrary to the long line of statutory and judicial authority underlying this rule. See text
accompanying notes 28-31 supra. The Act originally provided that if a corporate debtor
transferred stock to a creditor in satisfaction of its indebtedness that was not evidenced by a
"security," such corporation was treated as "not having transferred its stock, but ... as
having satisfied the indebtedness with an amount of money equal to the fair market value of
the stock." Essentially, this earlier draft of the Act treated the corporate debtor as not hav-
ing issued its own stock; thus, the general nonrecognition treatment under § 1032 was un-
available. Instead, the corporate debtor was treated as having retired its outstanding
indebtedness by paying cash equal to the fair market value of the "disregarded" stock. To
the extent the principal amount of the outstanding nonsecurity indebtedness was greater
than the amount of the deemed money transfer, cancellation of indebtedness income would
have been generated to the corporate debtor. H.R. 5043, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 108(f)(1)(A)
(1980). Because this rule would have applied to all debtors, solvent, insolvent, or title 11,
income would have been recognized unless the transaction was one to which the proposed
section 108 general exclusionary rule would have applied. H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong.,
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to new section 108(e)(8), the exception will not apply in the following
instances:
(1) when the corporate debtor issues nominal or token shares of its
stock in satisfaction of outstanding indebtedness; 35 and
(2) in the case of an unsecured creditor involved in a "workout,"1 36 if
such creditor receives an amount of stock with a value less than one-half
the fair market value of stock that such creditor would receive if all of the
corporate debtor's unsecured creditors, to the extent their debts are either
cancelled or satisfied with the corporate debtor's stock, received a pro rata
amount of stock.137
The Act additionally provides that if a creditor acquires stock of a cor-
poration in exchange for its debt, and as a part of such transaction the
creditor claims a bad debt deduction 138 with respect to the indebtedness
surrendered, a special recapture rule may come into play upon later dispo-
sition of the stock received by such creditor. 139 In this instance, a creditor
disposing of stock received in an earlier debt-for-stock exchange will re-
capture a certain amount as ordinary income. The recapture amount is to
be determined by applying the section 1245 recapture rule as if the stock
were depreciable property, and the excess of previously taken bad debt
deductions over gain recognized by the creditor (or the loss recognized by
2d Sess. 15 (1980). For modifications by the Senate Finance Committee, see S. REP. No.
1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
According to the Committee Report, the intent of this attempted reversal of prior law was
to "better coordinate the treatment of discharged debt at the corporate level with the treat-
ment at the creditor level." Committee Report, supra note 72, at 13. Such an approach
seemingly would have required income inclusion to the corporate debtor, subject to deferral
under proposed § 108, to the extent that the creditor had taken or would have taken a partial
bad debt deduction with respect to the satisfied indebtedness. While the tax theory of this
earlier version of the Act appeared to have been sound, in that a partial bad debt deduction
to the creditor would have been mirrored by an equal amount of cancellation of indebted-
ness income, the creation of a taxable event when the economic role of the parties essentially
continued intact seemed inappropriate. In addition, this approach shifted the tax burden to
the corporate debtor in lieu of other alternatives. Perhaps most importantly, the the earlier
draft appeared to have been an economically unjustified drain of cash flow in the form of an
increased tax liability with respect to insolvent or bankrupt corporate debtors. Finally, the
earlier draft's reliance on a fair market value index of the corporate debtor's stock would
have created an administrative nightmare so far as valuation is concerned. Accordingly, the
use of stock-for-debt rehabilitation programs by corporate debtors could have been ham-
pered severely under the Act as proposed. Primarily in response to these criticisms, an
amendment repealed this earlier draft of the Act and reinstated the stock-for-debt exception
to the Kirby Lumber rule, subject to the two narrow exceptions discussed in the text.
135. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(A).
136. As defined in the Senate Finance Report, a "workout" includes a title II case or
other transaction or series of transactions involving a "significant restructuring of the debt of
a corporation in financial difficulty." Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 17 n.20.
137. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(B).
138. Id §§ 166(a), (c). The bad debt deduction taken by the creditor is reduced by the
gain recognized on the earlier stock-for-debt exchange that was included in the gross income
of the creditor. In addition, any loss recognized by such creditor is subject to this special
recapture rule.
139. Id. § 108(c)(7)(A). If the stock of the creditor is-disposed of in a tax-free transac-
tion, the potential recapture will carryover in the stock received. Senate Finance Report,
supra note 72, at 18.
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such creditor on the exchange) were treated as depreciation deductions. 140
The Act also applies the discharge of indebtedness rules to certain con-
tributions to the capital of the corporate debtor. For the corporate debtor
receiving its indebtedness from a shareholder as a contribution to capital,
the normal tax-free contribution to capital rule, which generally excludes
such amounts from gross income,' 4' will no longer apply. Rather, to the
extent that the amount of the debt transferred to the corporation as a con-
tribution to capital exceeds the shareholder's basis in such debt, such ex-
cess will be treated as a debt discharge amount to the corporation. 42
Thus, the discharge of indebtedness rules will override the tax-free capital
contribution rule when a cash basis taxpayer contributes to the capital of
his accrual method corporation an outstanding corporate indebtedness
representing an accrued expense previously deducted by the corpora-
tion. 143 This provision of the Act reverses the holding of Putoma Corp. v.
Commissioner. 44 Moreover, the Legislative Reports indicate that even a
shareholder contribution to capital structured as a gift will not permit the
corporate debtor to avoid cancellation of indebtedness income. 145
E Miscellaneous Rules Concerning Cancellation of Indebtedness Income
1. Investment Tax Credit Recapture. In the event the basis of qualified
investment credit property is reduced by a debt discharge amount, the Act
provides that no investment tax credit recapture will result, because the
reduction of basis in this manner is not considered a "disposition" of the
property. 46 This provision overturns the position taken by the Service in
prior cases,147 thus precluding the recapture of investment tax credit even
in those cases involving basis reduction by insolvent and bankrupt debtors.
This safe haven, however, will not extend to purchase price adjustments. 148
The reduction of a purchase price as a result of direct negotiations between
the seller and buyer therefore will result in a pro tanto "disposition" within
the meaning of the investment tax credit provisions, which will result in
the recapture of investment tax credit by an amount attributable to such
140. See Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 18, example.
141. 1.R.C. § 118.
142. Id. § 108(e)(6).
143. See Committee Report, supra note 72, at 15 n.21; Senate Finance Report, supra note
72, at 18-19. See also I.R.C. § 118, effectively incorporating this rule by cross-reference to
id § 108. See also text accompanying notes 19-26 supra.
144. 66 T.C. 652 (1976), aff-d, 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979).
145. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 15 n.21; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72,
at 19 n.22.
146. I.R.C. § 1017(c)(2). See also Committee Report, supra note 72, at 15-16; Senate
Finance Report, supra note 72, at 20.
147. Rev. Rul. 74-184, 1974-1 C.B. 8. The Senate Finance Report indicates, however,
that this reversal of the Service's position is not intended as an inference as to the correct
interpretation of federal income tax law prior to the effective date of the Act. Senate Fi-
nance Report, supra note 72, at 20 n.24.
148. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 16 n.23; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72,
at 20.
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2. Related Party Transactions. New section 108(e)(4) is intended to
preclude the purchase of the debtor's outstanding indebtedness by a re-
lated party for token or minimal consideration in an attempt to insulate
such debtor from cancellation of indebtedness income. For purposes of
determining income of the debtor from the discharge of indebtedness, an
outstanding debt acquired from an unrelated party by a related party of
the debtor will be treated as having been acquired by the debtor itself.'50
Thus, the purchase of a debtor's outstanding indebtedness from an unre-
lated party by a related party will be treated as if the debtor had made the
purchase. Accordingly, if such purchase involves a discount or bargain
element, the debtor will be deemed to have realized cancellation of indebt-
edness income, subject to the Act's attribution reduction and depreciable
basis reduction rules. 15' The Act provides that members of the debtor's
family include the individual's spouse, children, grandchildren, parents,
and any spouse of the individual's children or grandchildren. 52 For pur-
poses of determining the category of related parties to which this provision
applies, the rules set forth in section 267(b) or section 707(b)(1) will
apply. 153
3. Lost Deductions. The Act also provides that cancellation of indebt-
edness income will not be realized to the extent of "lost deductions."'' 54
According to the legislative history, lost deductions include those liabilities
for which the debtor has not taken a tax benefit, usually in the form of a
deduction, and subsequently are cancelled. 15 5 This statutory exception es-
sentially encompasses the tax benefit concept: if a debtor has not taken a
tax advantage relative to an outstanding liability, no income consequences
should result from the cancellation of such debt.' 56
V. THE "G" TYPE CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
A. General Background
Under prior law, if a corporation transferred all or part of its assets to
another corporation pursuant to a court order in connection with a chapter
X proceeding of the old Bankruptcy Act, and the transferee corporation
was organized or used to effect the court-approved plan, such transfer
149. I.R.C. § 47(a). Such reduction should not result in recapture of depreciation, how-
ever, a result consistent with current law. See note 54 supra.
150. I.R.C. § 108(e)(4).
151. See text accompanying notes 71-123 supra. For an example of such a related party
transaction, see Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 19 n.23.
152. I.R.C. § 108(e)(4)(B).
153. Id. § 108(e)(4).
154. Id. § 108(e)(2).
155. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 16; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
20.
156. This exception should be compared to the "no accession to wealth" exception to the
Kirby Lumber rule. See note 37 supra.
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might have qualified as a tax-free reorganization under the special rules
relating to insolvency reorganization provisions.157 These provisions gen-
erally allowed less flexibility in structuring chapter X proceedings than the
rules applicable to regular corporate reorganizations. 5 8 In addition, the
insolvency reorganization provisions contained several inherent technical
defects and ambiguities.
Before its repeal by the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, the application of
section 371(a) was limited to transfers of the debtor corporation's assets to
another corporation pursuant to a court order in a "receivership, foreclo-
sure, or similar proceeding" 59 or "in a proceeding under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act." 160 While this language clearly applied to chapter X pro-
ceedings, whether section 37 1(a) applied to chapter XI proceedings as well
was unclear.' 6' Leading commentators concluded that the application of
section 371(a) to chapter XI proceedings was unresolved.162
Once section 371 was determined to apply to a given transaction (appar-
ently only chapter X and similar proceedings), the next step was to define
the elements of a section 371 transfer and the tax consequences of the
transfer. The primary characteristic of a section 371 reorganization was
overall flexibility, interladen with various uncertainties.163 While a section
371 transfer had been held not necessarily to involve the transfer of sub-
stantially all of the assets of the debtor corporation, 164 certain questions
remained unanswered. 165 A reasonable postulation, however, was that a
section 371 transfer applied to a receivership, foreclosure, chapter X, or
similar proceeding if it had the following elements: (1) a transfer of prop-
erty of the debtor corporation; (2) in pursuance of the order of a court
having jurisdiction over the debtor corporation; (3) to another corporation;
(4) that was formed to effectuate the approved plan of the court; (5) in
exchange solely for stock or securities in such other corporation.166
The Regulations indicated that the application of section 371 was to be
limited strictly to a transaction having these elements. 167 Moreover, the
section 371 transfer need not have been a "direct transfer"; apparently any
indirect transfer of the debtor corporation's assets would have sufficed, so
157. I.R.C. §§ 371-374 (1980).
158. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 28; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
33.
159. For a discussion of the meaning of the phrase "receivership, foreclosure, or similar
proceeding," see Tillinghaust & Gardner, Acquisitive Reorganizations and Chapters X and XI
of the Bankruptcy Act, 26 TAx L. REV. 663, 688-90 (1971).
160. I.R.C. § 371(a) (1980).
161. The regulations provided no authority for the application of § 371 to chapter XI
proceedings. Treas. Reg. § 1.371-1(a)(2) (1960). Moreover, a close examination of this Reg-
ulation arguably supported the conclusion that § 371 was restricted to the two statutorily
enumerated categories.
162. Tillinghaust & Gardner, supra note 159, at 690.
163. Id. at 697.
164. San Antonio Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1215 (1958), acq. in result 1963-1
C.B. 4.
165. See text accompanying notes 179-97 infra.
166. I.R.C. § 371(a) (1980).
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.371-1(a)(3) (1960).
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long as it was made as "an integral step in the consummation" of the
court-approved reorganization plan.' 68 Finally, a transfer of assets, rather
than a mere debt or capital readjustment, must have occurred. 169 Even
though a section 371 "reorganization" was not married to the definition of
that term in section 368, several of the concepts espoused in the section 368
reorganization area applied to section 371 as well. 170
In terms of the tax results of a section 371 transfer, the acquired debtor
corporation recognized no gain or loss upon the transfer of its assets if the
consideration received by it was limited to stock or securities of the acquir-
ing corporation. 17' Moreover, if cash or nonqualifying consideration
("boot") was received by the acquired debtor corporation, no gain was rec-
ognized if such property was distributed immediately to its sharehold-
ers. 172 In the event boot was not distributed to shareholders, the acquired
debtor corporation recognized gain to the extent of boot, but never was
permitted to recognize loss. 173 The basis of the assets received by the ac-
quiring corporation in a section 371 reorganization was carried over from
the acquired debtor corporation, 174 notwithstanding a slightly different re-
sult in the case of a regular chapter X or XI proceeding not involving sec-
tion 371.175
The tax results to creditors participating in a section 371 transfer de-
pended on the type of creditor involved in the transaction. Generally,
creditors who did not constitute security holders were required to recog-
nize gain or loss on the exchange.' 76 Accordingly, creditors on open ac-
count or those holding short-term notes and commercial paper were
required to recognize gain or loss on the exchange of their debt instru-
ments for stock or securities in the acquiring corporation. With respect to
security holders, no gain or loss was recognized on the exchange of their
securities for stock in the acquiring corporation, even if the principal
amount of the securities received was greater than the amount surren-
168. Id
169. Id
170. Treas. Reg. § 1.371-1(a)(4) (1960) (stating that the continuity of business and inter-
est doctrines applicable in noninsolvency reorganizatons also applied to § 371 transfers; if
the transfer more closely resembles a sale of assets, the transaction constitutes a "sale" rather
than a tax-free reorganization).
171. I.R.C. § 371(a)(1) (1980).
172. Id § 371(a)(2)(A).
173. Id §§ 37 1(a)(2)(A)-(B). In addition, the liabilities of the acquired-debtor corpora-
tion assumed by the acquiring corporation were not to be treated as boot, even if such liabil-
ities exceeded the aggregate bases of property transferred. But cf. I.R.C. § 357(b) (gain will
be recognized if purpose of assumption of liabilities is to avoid taxes).
174. Id § 372(a).
175. Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, the bases of the debtor's
assets were reduced to the extent of the debt discharge amount, but not below their fair
market value. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, §§ 268-270, 395-396, 52 Stat.
840, 904, 915 (repealed 1978).
176. Bedford v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1189 (1943), a]J'd, 150 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1945);




dered. 177 Moreover, if boot was received by security holders, any recog-
nized gain generally was treated as capital gain rather than dividend
income. 178
The acquiring corporation in a section 371 transfer had to concern itself
with the extent to which the debtor corporation's tax attributes, including
net operating loss carryovers, would pass to the acquiring corporation.
The crux of this issue was whether the provision of section 381 authorizing
such carryover applied to a section 371 reorganization. Leading commen-
tators, while acknowledging the lack of authority on this point, concluded
that section 381 appeared to be inapplicable to section 371; 17 9 the special
insolvency reorganization provisions seemingly did not permit carryover
of tax attributes to the transferee corporation. 180
The prior law left unclear the extent to which creditors of an insolvent
corporation who received stock in exchange for their claims were consid-
ered to have stepped into the shoes of the debtor corporation's former
shareholders for purposes of satisfying the judicial "continuity of interest"
rule.' 8' The continuity of interest rule requires that owners of the acquired
corporation must continue to have a substantial proprietary interest in the
acquiring corporation in order to justify nonrecognition treatment for the
exchange of the acquired corporation's stock or assets for stock in the ac-
quiring corporation.' 8 2 Courts generally have found the requisite con-
tinuity of interest if the creditors' debt interests were transformed into
proprietary interests (ie., stock) prior to the bankruptcy reorganization.183
Before enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1980, however, it was unclear
whether the creditors were required to take affirmative steps, or whether
the mere receipt of stock in a bankruptcy reorganization was sufficient to
ensure tax-free treatment of the transfer of assets by the debtor corporation
177. I.R.C. § 371(b) (1980); cf I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(A) (gain recognized if principal amount
of securities received exceeds principal amount of securities surrendered).
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.371-2(c)(1) (1960). Gain was not recognized with respect to accrued
interest on securities surrendered. Estate of William Bernstern v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.
1364 (1954); Carman v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 1029 (1949), aft'd, 189 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.
1951); see text accompanying notes 216-20 infra.
179. See Tillinghaust & Gardner, supra note 159, at 706.
180. I.R.C. § 381(a) (1980) permitted an acquiring or transferee corporation to inherit
the tax attributes of the acquired or transferor corporation if the transaction was one to
which § 361 applied and the transfer of assets to the acquiring or transferee corporation was
in connection with certain types of § 368(a)(1) reorganizations described in § 381(a). This
did not include a § 371 insolvency reorganization. Section 381(a) was the key provision
authorizing one corporation's tax history to flow to another corporation. Because a § 371
reorganization was not enumerated in § 381(a), the tax history of a corporation undergoing
an insolvency reorganization would not carry over to the transferee corporation. See also
note 166 supra.
181. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 28 n. 1. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(a) (1960). The
percentage of equity ownership interests required of shareholders of the acquired corpora-
tion in order to satisfy the continuity of interest rule has been a fruitful source of litigation.
The Service's official position with respect to continuity of interest is 50%. Rev. Proc. 77-37,
1977-2, C.B. 568. The courts have required a mere 33% interest to satisfy the continuity of
interest doctrine. See, e.g., John A. Nelson Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 374 (1935).
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1960).
183. Commissioner v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942); Treas.
Reg. § 1.371-1(a)(4) (1960). See also Tillinghaust & Gardner, supra note 159, at 683-86.
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to the transferee.1 84
Several other technical aspects of insolvency reorganizatons prior to en-
actment of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 were problematic. In an insol-
vency reorganization, the stock or securities used to acquire the assets of
the corporation in bankruptcy had to be the acquiring corporation's own
stock or securities. 85 This limitation precluded the use of a triangular re-
organization, whereby the insolvent corporation could be acquired for
stock of the parent corporation in control of the acquiring corporation. 186
Triangular reorganizations outside of insolvency proceedings generally
have been approved, assuming certain guidelines are met. 18 7 In addition,
the prior law did not make clear whether and to what extent the acquiring
corporation in an insolvency proceeding could have transferred assets that
it had received from the insolvent corporation into a controlled corpora-
tion as part of the insolvency reorganization. 88 The statute permits
"drop-down" transfers of assets acquired in corporate reorganizations in
noninsolvency reorganizations. 89
Several provisions concerning reorganizations under section 368 differ
from those contained in section 371. In noninsolvency corporate reorgani-
zations, the exchange of stock or securities in one corporation for those of
another corporation is not tax-free to the extent the principal amount of
the securities received exceeds the principal amount of the securities sur-
rendered' 90 (or to the extent of the principal amount of securities received,
if no securities are surrendered).' 91 In regular corporate reorganizations,
money or other property received in a corporate reorganization (other than
stock or securities of the acquiring corporation) is subject to the "dividend
equivalence" test.' 92 These rules, however, apparently did not apply to
insolvency reorganizations qualifying under section 371.193
With respect to all types of reorganizations, a bondholder's claim for
unpaid interest generally is treated as an integral part of the underlying
security to which it relates, so that the surrender of the security together
with the claim for unpaid interest is treated as the surrender of a security
only. 194 Prior to passage of the Act, the nonrecognition reorganization
provisions accordingly applied to an exchange involving a security with
accrued but unpaid interest, even though the unpaid interest would have
184. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 28; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
33.
185. See I.R.C. § 371(a) (1980) (flush language).
186. For an example of the triangular reorganization, see id §§ 368(a)(2)(D)-(E).
187. Id
188. No statutory provisions apparently covered a "drop down" of assets received from
an insolvent corporation in a § 371 insolvency proceeding to a controlled corporation of the
acquiring or transferee corporation.
189. Id § 368(a)(2)(C).
190. Id § 354(a)(2)(A).
191. Id § 354(a)(2)(B).
192. Id § 356(a)(2).
193. Id § 371(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.371-1(b) (1960).
194. Carman v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1951); Estate of William Bernstern
v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1364 (1959).
19811
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
been taxable as ordinary income, had it been paid separately. 95
B. Defnitional and Operational Aspects of the "G" Reorganization
The Legislative Reports state as a general purpose that the insolvency
reorganization rules should be revamped in order to provide consistency to
all types of reorganizations, including those involving insolvent corpora-
tions, 196 so as to facilitate the rehabilitation of financially troubled busi-
nesses.197 In addition, the Reports state that a creditor that exchanges
securities in a corporate reorganization should be treated as receiving in-
terest income on the exchange to the extent it receives new securities, stock,
or other property for accrued but unpaid interest on the securities surren-
dered. 198 To carry out the foregoing objectives, a new reorganization defi-
nition, entitled the "G" reorganization, is added by the Act; 199
concomitantly, the Act repeals the insolvency reorganization rules under
section 371 and makes certain other conforming amendments.
The Act defines a G reorganization as "a transfer by a corporation of all
or part of its assets to another corporation in a bankruptcy or similar case;
but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation
to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which
qualifies under section 354, 355 or 356."2 00 The Legislative Reports note
that the transfer need not comply with state merger laws nor be solely in
exchange for stock of the acquiring corporation to qualify as a G reorgani-
zation.20' Moreover, the definition of a G reorganization does not require
the former shareholders of the financially distressed corporation to "con-
trol" the corporation that receives the assets;202 the distribution require-
ments of section 354(b)(1) are included in the statute, however, to ensure
that either "substantially all" the assets of the financially troubled corpora-
tion, or assets constituting an active trade or business under section 355,
are transferred to the acquiring corporation.20 3
The Legislative Reports indicate that the "substantially all" test in the G
reorganization context is to be interpreted in light of the underlying intent
195. The theory underlying this rule is that, because the unpaid interest is an integral
part of the security to which it relates, the exchange of the security together with the claim
for unpaid interest thereon in an otherwise nonrecognition transaction is an inappropriate
event upon which to levy tax.
196. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 29.
197. Id
198. Id at 29-30.
199. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(G) adds this reorganization mechanism. Id Section 370 repeals
the old law under § 371. An exception to this blanket repeal is made with respect to certain
railroad reorganizations. Id § 370(b).
200. Id § 368(a)(l)(G).
201. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 30; Senate Report, supra note 72, at 35. Com-
pare this rule to the "solely" requirement of I.R.C. § 371(b)(1).
202. Compare I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(D). For purposes of reorganizations, the term "con-
trol" is defined in § 368(c), which generally requires an 80% equity ownership of specified
types of stock. Id § 368(c).
203. Id § 368(a)(2)(C); Committee Report, supra note 72, at 30; Senate Finance Report,
supra note 72, at 36.
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of the newly added G category.2°4 The primary goal of the G reorganiza-
tion is to facilitate the rehabilitation of financially distresssd corporations;
thus, the insolvent corporation may be forced to liquidate liabilities or to
sell assets or even business divisions to raise cash. These preliminary cor-
porate extractions of cash and assets will not be taken into account in de-
termining whether the transfer of "substantially all" of the assets of the
transferor has taken place. For example, a transaction should not be pre-
cluded from satisfying the "substantially all" test merely because the ac-
quired corporation sells a significant portion of its assets to raise cash to
make payments to its creditors prior to the transfer. 20 5
A transaction that qualifies as a G reorganization is not to be treated as
a liquidation under section 332, an incorporation under section 351, or a
reorganization under another category of section 368(a)(1). 206 The con-
tinuity of interest limitations are eased significantly for insolvency reorga-
nizations, because short-term creditors who receive stock of the acquiring
corporation in exchange for their claims may be counted for purposes of
satisfying the continuity of interest rule. The Legislative Reports indicate,
however, that such short-term creditors nonetheless may be required to
recognize the gain or loss realized on such exchange.20 7 This relaxation of
the continuity of interest rule will permit insolvency reorganizations to
qualify more easily under the G reorganization.
The Act adds consistency to G reorganizations by adopting certain rules
used in the general reorganization provisions. For instance, the Act per-
mits a corporation to acquire the claim of a creditor in a G reorganization
in exchange for stock of the acquiring corporation's parent;2o8 thus, the use
of triangular reorganizations will be permitted in a G reorganization con-
text. In addition, the transfer of the acquired assets by the acquiring cor-
poration to a controlled subsidiary will no longer endanger the tax-free
status of the prior reorganization.2°9 Perhaps more importantly, the Act
provides that the general rule governing carryover of tax attributes in cor-
porate reorganizations will apply to G reorganizations. 210 The Legislative
204. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 30; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
35-36.
205. Id This rule should be compared with the more restrictive rule concerning corpo-
rate extractions immediately prior to other reorganizations, such as in a "C" type reorgani-
zation. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
206. I.R.C. § 368(a)(3)(C).
207. See Committee Report, upra note 72, at 31-32; Senate Finance Report, supra note
72, at 36-37. The legislative history indicates that the courts and the Treasury Department
will apply a more liberal continuity of interest rule to "G" reorganizations, namely, an ap-
proach that takes into account the modification of the so-called "absolute priority" rule as
altered by Public Law 95-598. According to the reports, this modification causes sharehold-
ers or junior creditors of the bankrupt corporation, who previously might have been ex-
cluded from a post-bankruptcy ownership stake in the surviving corporations, to retain an
interest in the reorganized corporation. If nonstock consideration is received by the debtor-
corporation's shareholders, however, the transaction may resemble a sale rather than a reor-
ganization. Id
208. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D).
209. Id § 368(a)(2)(C).
210. Id. § 381(a)(2).
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Reports note that this rule will eliminate the so called "clean slate" doc-
trine; the new carryover rule reflects the fact that adjustments may be
made to an insolvent corporation's tax attributes to reflect the amount of
debt discharge income.21
As noted earlier, a financially troubled corporation having substantial
net operating loss carryovers is frequently the target of either a stock ac-
quisition or merger notwithstanding a limited economic value of the net
assets of such corporation.2 m2 For example, a corporation having a minis-
cule net book value but bearing substantial net operating loss carryovers
could merge in a tax free transaction into a profitable corporation for a
significant purpose of using such loss carryovers against post-acquisition
net income of the profitable corporation. In order to use freely the
financially troubled corporation's loss carryovers in this fashion, the for-
mer shareholders of the acquired corporation must receive a statutorily
prescribed amount of stock of the acquiring corporation and meet certain
other conditions, under section 382. Generally, section 382 limits carry-
overs of net operating losses in two separate instances. First, section 382(a)
limits carryovers of net operating losses in those instances in which a tax-
able purchase of control of the loss corporation has been followed by a
change in the corporation's business. Secondly, section 382(b) limits the
use of net operating loss carryovers when a profitable company acquires in
a tax free reorganization a company having substantial loss carryovers and
there is an insufficient continuity of shareholder interest following the cor-
porate reorganization. Although the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has made
certain fundamental changes to these rules that will become effective dur-
ing 1982,213 the basic theory underlying section 382 will continue to apply
to prospective transactions.
Prior to the passage of the Act, with respect to section 382(a) transac-
tions involving the acquisition of stock of a debtor corporation that has
generated substantial net operating losses, acquisitions by a security holder
or creditor of stock of the loss corporation in exchange for the relinquish-
ment or extinguishment in whole or part of a claim against the corporation
was not to be counted as the purchase of new stock for section 382(a) pur-
poses.214 To place tax free reorganizations on a par with taxable purchase
transactions, the Act adds a new provision that provides that creditors of a
debtor corporation are to be treated as shareholders immediately before
the reorganization for section 382(b) purposes. 21 5 Accordingly, creditors
who obtain stock in a debtor corporation as a part of a tax free reorganiza-
tion will not be counted against the continuity of interest requirement of
211. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 32; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
37.
212. See notes 57-70 supra and accompanying text.
213. For a discussion of these rules, see Barr, Net Operating Losses-Sections 381, 382,
and 269, 27-4th TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO (BNA) A-43 (1981).
214. I.R.C. § 382(a)(5)(C) (1980).
215. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(d)(7), 94 Stat. 3389, 3392.
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section 382(b) for purposes of determining the limitation on the loss carry-
overs of the debtor corporation.
C Treatment o/Accrued Interest on Exchanged Securities
The Act provides that a creditor exchanging securities in any corporate
reorganization described in section 368(a)(1) will be treated as receiving
interest income on the exchange when the security holder receives new
securities, stock, or other property attributable to accrued but unpaid inter-
est.2 16 The legislative history indicates that this rule also will apply to ac-
crued original issue discount on securities surrendered in any type of
reorganization.217 These rules represent a reversal of prior law, under
which accrued interest or accrued original issue discount with respect to
surrendered securities could be eliminated tax-free in a recapitalization or
other reorganization qualifying under section 368.218 The new rule will
apply whether or not the exchanging security holder realizes gain on the
exchange.219 In the case of accrued original issue discount, the Act does
not appear to provide for a concomitant adjustment in the basis of the
stock received in the transaction to reflect the income inclusion attributa-
ble to the original issue discount.220
VI. OTHER CORPORATE AMENDMENTS UNDER THE ACT
.4. Exception from Personal Holding Company Status
Formerly, a corporation in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings that
had ceased active operations and was generating only passive income
could find itself subject to the personal holding company tax22' with re-
spect to certain passive income. This result seemed particularly likely if
such corporation's assets were converted into investments that produced
passive income before the corporation was liquidated. The Legislative Re-
ports indicate that the involuntary imposition of personal holding com-
pany status on an insolvent or bankrupt corporate debtor is beyond the
legislative intent of the personal holding company provisions.222 Accord-
ingly, the Act provides that a corporation subject to bankruptcy court ju-
risdiction is not to be considered a personal holding company.223 The
legislative history indicates that this exception is not available if the major
purpose in commencing or continuing the bankruptcy proceedings is the
216. I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(B). See also id § 355(a)(3)(C).
217. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 33.
218. See note 17 supra.
219. Because I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(B) excludes the tax-free rule of 354(a)(1) in accrued in-
terest situations, implicitly no gain on the exchange is required.
220. To equalize the effect of the recognition of ordinary income resulting from the ac-
crued interest attributable to original issue discount, an adjustment to basis is seemingly
necessary, as is the case in § 1232(b)(2).
221. I.R.C. § 541.
222. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 36; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
40.
223. I.R.C. § 542(c)(9).
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avoidance of the personal holding company tax.224
B. Extension of the Twelve-Month Period of Section 337
Under prior law, a corporation that adopted a plan of liquidation and
liquidated in a complete distribution to its shareholders within twelve
months thereafter generally did not recognize gain or loss on sales of its
assets within the twelve-month period. 225 This rule had two major defects
in connection with bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. First, the Serv-
ice had ruled that section 337 did not apply in the case of an insolvency
proceeding where the corporate debtor's assets were transferred to credi-
tors rather than shareholders in a liquidation. 226 In addition, the period
during which liquidation occurred exceeded twelve months in most insol-
vency or bankruptcy proceedings; therefore, the special nonrecognition
rule of section 337 placed an undue hardship if not an impossibility on the
financially distressed business forced to accelerate its bankruptcy plan.
The legislative history to the Act notes that the nonrecognition treatment
of section 337 should be extended to sales of certain assets by liquidating
insolvent corporations in bankruptcy or similar cases. 227 The Legislative
Reports indicate that, inasmuch as insolvency proceedings may last longer
than twelve months, the nonrecognition period likewise should be' ex-
tended until the termination of the insolvency case.228 The legislative his-
tory points out, however, that because the nonrecognition period would
extend until the termination of the bankruptcy case, a rule should be in-
cluded to preclude the otherwise abusive tax-free churning of assets. In
addition, nonrecognition treatment should be unavailable on sales of prop-
erty acquired after adoption of the liquidation plan.229
The Act permits an insolvent corporation in bankruptcy, which does not
distribute property to its shareholders in exchange for their stock, to sell
certain of its assets tax free, when the corporation adopts a plan of com-
plete liquidiation after the bankruptcy case commences and transfers all of
the corporation's assets to its creditors upon liquidation. The period for
nonrecognition begins on the date of adoption of the plan of liquidation
and ends when the bankruptcy case terminates. 230 The new provision,
however, does not apply to assets acquired on or after the date of adoption
of the plan of liquidation, other than inventory sold in bulk.231
224. Id Committee Report, supra note 72, at 36; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72,
at 40.
225. I.R.C. § 337(a).
226. Rev. Rul. 56-387, 1956-2 C.B. 189.
227. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 37; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
41.
228. Id
229. Id An exclusion is available, however, with respect to bulk sales of inventory.
I.R.C. § 337(c)(2).
230. Id § 337(g).
231. Id
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C Certain Transfers to Controlled Corporations
Before passage of the Act, if property was transferred to a corporation
controlled by the transferor, no gain or loss was realized in connection
with the transfer, provided certain conditions were met.232 For purposes
of applying this nonrecognition rule, the term "property" included indebt-
edness of the transferee corporation not evidenced by a security233 as wel
as claims for accrued interest or indebtedness of the transferee corpora-
tion.234 The Legislative Reports indicate that creditors holding a debt not
evidenced by a security who exchange their claims against a debtor corpo-
ration for stock constituting "control" of such corporation should recog-
nize gain or loss on the exchange. 235 This treatment comports with the
treatment of those creditors who exchange nonsecurity debt instruments in
a reorganization. 236
The Legislative Reports further note that a transfer of assets to a corpo-
ration by a debtor in a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, when the
stock received later is transferred to the debtor's creditors, should result in
gain or loss to the debtor, rather than nonrecognition pursuant to section
351 (a). In this instance, the exchange is treated as if the property had been
transferred to the creditors, who in turn transferred the property to a con-
trolled corporation. According to the Legislative Reports, this rule is
designed to prevent the incorporation by a debtor of high basis, low-value
assets, when a transfer of the assets directly to the creditors, followed by a
transfer by the creditors to a controlled corporation, otherwise would re-
sult in a presumably lower fair market value basis to the corporation. 237
The Act provides that transfers to a controlled corporation of indebted-
ness of a corporation not evidenced by a security, or claims against the
corporation for accrued but unpaid interest on indebtedness, will not be
considered property for section 351 purposes; thus, such transfers will not
be shielded from taxation by the general recognition rule of section
351(a).238 In addition, the Act provides that the nonrecognition rule of
section 351 will not apply when assets are transferred to a controlled cor-
poration of the debtor in a bankruptcy or similar case, to the extent the
stock or securities received in the exchange for the assets are used by the
debtors to pay off debts.239 Gain or loss will be recognized if the debtor
232. Id § 351(a).
233. Duncan v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 468 (1947), acq. 1948-2 C.B. 2. See also Rev. Rul.
77-81, 1977-1 C.B. 97.
234. See note 178 supra.
235. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 39; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
43.
236. Id See text accompanying note 207 supra. For a further discussion of present law,
see B. BITrKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 14-76 n.106 (5th ed. 1979).
237. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 39; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
43.
238. I.R.C. §§ 351 (d)(2)-(3). But note that when a transaction qualifies under both
§ 351(a) and § 368(a)(l)(G), such transaction will be treated under 368(a)(1)(G) only.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(3)(C).
239. Id § 351(e)(2).
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transfers its assets to a controlled corporation and the stock received by the
debtor then is transferred to its creditors pursuant to a plan approved in a
bankruptcy or similar case.240 Because the basis of the stock received is
adjusted for any gain or loss recognized, the amount of income recognized
in the transfer of the stock to creditors will reflect the amount recognized
on the incorporation transfer. The legislative history notes that the sum
total of income or loss to the debtor in the two transfers is the same as if
the high-basis assets had been transferred directly to the creditors. 24'
D. Interrelationship Between Debt Discharge Amounts
and Earnings and Profits
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, the effect of
discharge of indebtedness upon earnings and profits of the corporation in a
bankruptcy proceeding was unclear.242 The Act now provides that to the
extent income from discharge of indebtedness (including amounts ex-
cluded from gross income pursuant to new section 108) is applied to re-
duce the basis of assets of the corporate debtor under section 1017, the
amount of the basis reduction will not affect the debtor corporation's earn-
ings and profits.243 Reduced depreciation deductions or increased gains on
the sale of such reduced-basis assets will affect earnings and profits in
years in which the deductions are taken or sales made. Any other dis-
charge of indebtedness income, however, including amounts excluded
from gross income, will increase earnings and profits. 244
VII. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1980
A. Jurisdictional and Procedural Aspects Under
the Old Bankruptcy Act
Under the old Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court generally had ju-
risdiction to determine the income tax liability of the debtor, whether or
not the Service had assessed such liability.245 The bankruptcy court's ju-
risdiction over tax matters was denied, however, when the debtor's tax lia-
bility already had been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.246
240. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 39; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
43. If less than all of such stock is transferred to creditors, a proportionate share of the gain
or loss is recognized. Id
241. Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 44. The legislative history also notes that
the bases of assets in the hands of the corporation are adjusted to reflect any gain or loss
recognition on the transfer. If the transaction constitutes a reorganization, § 361 would
overrule the application of this new rule in the case of a corporate transferor. Id n.8.
242. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 39; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
44. See also text accompanying note 56 supra.
243. I.R.C. § 312(1).
244. Id
245. Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 89-496, § I, 80 Stat. 280 (1966) (repealed 1978). See
also City of Amarillo v. Eakens, 399 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051
(1969).
246. See City of Amarillo v. Eakens, 399 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1968, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1051 (1969).
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While a determination by the bankruptcy court with respect to the pre-
petition tax liability of a debtor was binding on the Service and the trustee
of the bankrupt's estate, such a determination might not have been binding
upon the debtor individually, unless the debtor had invoked the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court's decision
with regard to pre-petition income taxes of the debtor might not settle the
personal liability of such debtor for the amount of any pre-petition nondis-
chargeable tax claims not satisfied out of the assets of the bankrupt's es-
tate.247 This inability to bind the individual debtor, due to the bankruptcy
court's lack of exclusive jurisdiction, led in many instances to duplicative
litigation, insofar as the Service was forced by the individual debtor to
relitigate the tax issues if the Service's claim was not paid out of the assets
of the bankrupt's estate.248
Under prior law, the Service was authorized to ,assess any income tax
liabilities against the debtor upon the institution of a bankruptcy proceed-
ing. 249 Essentially, this allowed the Service to deviate from normal statu-
tory safeguard procedures under which a deficiency notice was required to
be issued to the debtor before assessment of the tax could be made. Upon
issuance of a deficiency notice, the debtor could have challenged such as-
serted income tax liability in the United States Tax Court without the pay-
ment of the asserted tax.250 Even if the statutory deficiency notice had
been issued and the time for filing a Tax Court petition had not expired
before commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor still was
barred from contesting the asserted tax liability in the Tax Court if the
Service chose to exercise its immediate assessment authority.25 Thus, un-
less the debtor invoked the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and ob-
tained from that court a determination of his income tax liability, he
effectively was precluded from prepayment review of an asserted income
tax liability. The debtor's only alternative was to pay the tax and then
contest the issue through refund claim procedures in the United States
District Court or the Court of Claims.252 Furthermore, if the notice of
deficiency was issued and the Tax Court case was filed prior to the institu-
tion of the bankruptcy proceeding, but the Tax Court had not reached a
decision as to the debtor's income tax liability, both the bankruptcy court
and the Tax Court had jurisdiction to determine the tax liability issue. A
decision by the Tax Court would not necessarily have bound the estate of
247. Pursuant to the new Bankruptcy Code, claims made by the Service against the
bankruptcy estate for pre-petition tax liabilities not satisifed out of the estate's assets are not
discharged upon termination of the bankruptcy proceeding and are collectible from the
debtor after such termination. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. III 1979).
248. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 41; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
47.
249. I.R.C. § 6871(a) (1980).
250. Id § 6213(a). Even in nonbankruptcy proceedings, however, other exceptions exist
to the general rule that a deficiency notice must be issued before assessment can be made.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6213(b)(l)-(4), 6213(c), (d), (e), 6851, 6861.
251. I.R.C. § 6871(a) (1980).
252. I.R.C. §§ 6401-6428.
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the bankrupt, however, unless the bankruptcy trustee intervened in the
Tax Court litigation. On the other hand, a decision by the bankruptcy
court might not have bound the individual debtor unless the debtor indi-
vidually invoked the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.253 Under the old
Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over suits
for refunds; thus, the trustee or debtor seeking a refund was required to file
suit in the United States District Court or the Court of Claims, even if the
government had filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy matter.254 Under
the old Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court could not compel the Serv-
ice to audit and approve returns, or calculate net operating losses.
255
B. Jurisdictional and Procedural Aspects Under the New Bankruptcy
Code and the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
The new Bankruptcy Code continues the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
to determine liability for an income tax deficiency, regardless of whether it
has been assessed, unless it has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction prior to filing of the bankruptcy petition. 256 The trustee in the
bankruptcy proceeding can request the Service to determine the amount of
any tax refund, and the Service is given 120 days in which to determine the
amount of such refund. After the Service determines the amount, or after
the 120-day period expires, the bankruptcy court, contrary to prior law,2
57
is free to determine the amount of the refund due to the bankruptcy es-
tate. 258 The Bankruptcy Code also enables a trustee to file tax returns for
the estate and request that the Service determine the estate's tax
liability.259
253. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 41; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
47.
254. This conclusion is premised on § 23(b) of the old Bankruptcy Act, which provided
that suits by a trustee or debtor were to be brought only in courts where the bankrupt might
have brought or prosecuted them if the bankruptcy proceeding had not been instituted.
Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 23(b), 52 Stat. 840, 854 (repealed 1978). See
also Danning v. United States, 259 F.2d 305, 306 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 911
(1959). The trustee could become a party to or prosecute any existing refund suit, subject to
approval by the bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 1 (c), 52 Stat. at 849; Meyer v.
Flemino, 327 U.S. 161, 165 (1946). Apparently the trustee could have prosecuted or entered
his appearance, commenced, and prosecuted any action or proceeding on behalf of the estate
before any tribunal, with or without court approval. BANKR. R. 610. Old Bankruptcy Act
§ 70(a)(5) also vested the trustee with title to all of the property, including rights of actions,
that prior to the commencement of the filing could have been transferred or levied upon.
Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 70(a)(5), 52 Stat. at 880.
255. See, e.g., In re Wingreen Co., 412 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1969).
256. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). The bankruptcy court may not determine
any right of the estate to a tax refund unless administrative remedies are first exhausted. Id
§ 505(a)(2)(B).
257. See note 247 supra.
258. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
259. Id. § 505(b). Upon the trustee's request to determine the estate's tax liability, the
Service has 60 days to notify the trustee that the return has been selected for audit examina-
tion. If an examination is made, the Service has an additional 120 days after the date of the
request to complete the examination and notify the trustee of any tax due. The bankruptcy
court may extend the 180-day period for just cause. If this time period expires without any
action by the Service, the trustee, the debtor, or any successor to the debtor is discharged
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Perhaps one of the most important procedural provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is the rule that commencement of the bankruptcy matter trig-
gers an automatic stay of any Tax Court proceeding regarding the debtor's
asserted tax deficiency. 260 Contrary to the concurrent jurisdiction rule
under prior law, this rule essentially will permit the bankruptcy court to
exert exclusive jurisdiction over tax matters concerning the debtor. Sub-
ject to certain exceptions discussed below, the Act similarly provides that
the Service no longer will have the power immediately to assess or collect a
pre-petition tax claim against the debtor; instead, such assessment power
will be stayed by the commencement of the bankruptcy case. 26' The stay
does not preclude the Service from issuing a deficiency notice during the
bankruptcy case. 262 Unless the bankruptcy court lifts the stay or grants or
denies a discharge, the stay continues until termination of the bankruptcy
case.263 The exclusive ability or power of the bankruptcy court to lift the
automatic stay will ensure the elimination of the duplicative litigation
problems common under prior law.
Under the Act the Service no longer can assess certain pre-petition tax
deficiencies immediately upon institution of a bankruptcy case. 264 If the
bankruptcy court lifts the automatic stay, therefore, the debtor will not be
precluded from filing a petition in Tax Court to challenge an asserted pre-
petition tax deficiency, provided the usual procedural prerequisites have
been satisfied.265 In effect, this change permits the individual debtor to
have pre-petition review of an asserted tax liability.
Two exceptions to this general prohibition against immediate assess-
ment exist. First, the Act provides that the Service will be able to make
immediate assessments of tax imposed on the bankruptcy estate of an indi-
vidual debtor. Also permissible is the immediate assessment of a tax im-
posed on a debtor if liability for such tax has become res judicata against
the debtor pursuant to a bankruptcy court determination. 266
from any liability for the tax, unless the return is fraudulent or contains a misrepresentation.
If the Service determines the tax to be due and owing within the specified time period, the
trustee may elect to pay the amount determined by the Service or may pay the amount
determined by the bankruptcy court after a hearing. In either event, if the return is not
fraudulent and contains no misrepresentations, the trustee, debtor, or any successor to the
debtor is discharged from any tax liability. If the trustee merely files the tax return without
requesting a determination of tax liability, a solvent debtor remains liable for the taxes as a
transferee of assets of the estate. Id See also 124 CONG. REC. S 17,428 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978) (remarks of Senator De Concini).
With respect to state and local taxes, § 1146(d) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a plan
proponent in a reorganization to request a determination from a state or local government
regarding the tax effects of a plan of bankruptcy reorganization. If the government does not
respond to such request within 270 days, the bankruptcy court may declare the tax effects of
the plan of the reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(d) (Supp. III 1979).
260. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979).
261. I.R.C. § 6871(a).
262. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(8) (Supp. III 1979).
263. Id § 362(c).
264. I.R.C. § 6871(a).
265. The remedies to the debtor under § 6213(a) thus will spring into life upon lifting of
the stay.
266. Id § 6871(b). According to the Senate Finance Report, these exceptions to the new
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VIII. BANKRUPTCY TAX ASPECTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR
A. Prior Tax Law Concerning Individual Debtors
According to the Legislative Reports, the tax aspects of bankruptcy law
with respect to individuals were in a state of confusion prior to the Act. 267
For example, no statutory rule specified whether the bankruptcy estate
constituted a taxable entity apart from the individual debtor. Little gui-
dance was available as to the allocation of tax attributes between the estate
and the debtor, assuming that they constituted separate taxable entities. In
addition, uncertainty existed as to the extent to which the debtor's pre-
petition tax liability could be collected out of the estate assets as a pre-
bankruptcy liability. For instance, under prior law the individual debtor's
taxable year would not close as of the commencement date of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, but rather would continue uninterrupted. The individ-
ual debtor would report income earned by him for the entire taxable year,
notwithstanding the fact that the debtor's assets passed to the bankruptcy
estate and arguably could not be used to satisfy his tax liability. 268 It gen-
erally was accepted, however, that most tax claims against the bankruptcy
estate were not dischargeable and, hence, could be collected from the indi-
vidual debtor after discharge of the bankruptcy case.269
B. The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980. Rules Concerning
the Individual Debtor
With respect to individual debtors, the Act provides for changes in four
major areas: the treatment of the debtor and the bankruptcy estate as sep-
arate entities, the debtor's election to close its taxable year, computation of
the bankruptcy estate's tax liability, and the computation of the individ-
ual's income tax liability. While a thorough discussion of each of these
topics is beyond the scope of this Article, several noteworthy points in each
area bear mentioning.
First, the Act treats the bankruptcy estate of an individual as a separate
taxable entity for federal income tax purposes. 270 The entities are not
treated separately, however, if a bankruptcy case involving an individual is
"no immediate assessment" rule merely reflect situations in which the pre-petition safeguard
is irrelevant. That is, the bankruptcy estate's tax liability is determined by the Bankruptcy
Court, and by law cannot be litigated in the Tax Court. Senate Finance Report, supra note
72, at 46-47. The situation involving res judicata of the debtor's tax liability is more obvious.
The district director of the Internal Revenue Service is notified by the bankruptcy clerk
upon the filing of a bankruptcy case. The Service must file a proof of claim with respect to
pre-petition tax liabilities within the time frame set forth by the Bankruptcy Code. This
generally is handled by the special procedures division of the district director's office.
267. Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at 24-32.
268. Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 C.B. 632. Under prior law, the Service treated the bank-
ruptcy estate as a separate taxable entity. Id
269. See note 260 supra.
270. I.R.C. § 1398(a). The effective date for bankruptcy tax rules affecting individuals is
March 24, 1981. A special election to apply the new law retroactive to October 1, 1979, is
available if the proceeding was commenced on or after October 1, 1979, and befoce January
1, 1981.
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commenced but subsequently dismissed by the ban'ruptcy court.271
When the bankruptcy case is prematurely dismissed, the legislative history
of the Act indicates that the debtor is to be treated as if no proceeding had
been brought.272 No separate taxable entity results from the commence-
ment of a bankruptcy case concerning a partnership or a corporation. 273
While this rule reverses the current position of the Service with respect to
partnerships, it appears to comport with the rule concerning bankruptcy
cases involving corporations. 274
Another important provision of the Act concerns the debtor's election to
close his taxable year upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. If the elec-
tion is made, the debtor's taxable year, which otherwise would include the
commencement date of the proceeding, will be divided into two short taxa-
ble years of less than twelve months. The first short period ends on the day
before the commencement date of the bankruptcy proceeding; the second
short period begins on the commencement date of such proceeding. 275 In
the event no election is made, the commencement of a bankruptcy case
will not affect the taxable year of the individual debtor.276 The substantive
results of such election should be examined carefully. In effect, the elec-
tion will cause the debtor's federal income tax liability for the pre-petition
or first short taxable year to become an allowable claim against the bank-
ruptcy estate, as a claim arising before bankruptcy. Thus, any pre-petition
tax liability for the short period is collectible from the estate, depending
upon the availability of estate assets to pay debts of that priority. In the
event such pre-petition tax liability is not satisfied out of the estate's assets,
it will remain a liability of the individual debtor insofar as such claims are
nondischargeable. 277 If the debtor does not make the election, no part of
his tax liability for the year in which the bankruptcy case arose is collecti-
ble from the estate; it is collectible directly from the individual debtor.
However, the debtor may then offset post-petition income against pre-peti-
tion losses since the taxable year of the debtor continues. The extent to
which the election is available with respect to individual debtors, and the
means by which the election is made, are specifically covered by the
Act.27
8
In an attempt to clarify prior law, the Act states that the bankruptcy
estate succeeds to most of the income tax attributes of the individual
271. Id § 1398(b)(1).
272. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 20; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
25.
273. I.R.C. § 1399; cf. Rev. Rut. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301 (prior law involving partner-
ships); Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-2(b), T.D. 6580, 1961-2 C.B. 123 (prior law involving
corporations).
274. See Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301; Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-2(b), T.D. 6580, 1961-2
C.B. 123.
275. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(3)(A). This special election is not allowed when the individual
debtor's assets are comprised of exempt property only. ld § 1398(d)(3)(C).
276. Id. § 1398(d)(2).
277. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
278. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 21-22; Senate Finance Report, supra note 72, at
26-27.
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debtor, including net operating loss carryovers. 279 Upon termination of
the bankruptcy estate, however, the debtor succeeds to all unused tax at-
tributes. 280 During the pendency of the bankruptcy estate, the tax liability
of the estate must be determined using the rules provided by the Act.
281 If
the bankruptcy estate itself incurs a net operating loss, the Act provides
that the estate can carry back such net operating loss to previous taxable
years of the estate as well as to taxable years of the individual debtor, even
though such years relate to periods prior to commencement of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 282 The Act treats all items of income and deductions
arising after the commencement of the bankruptcy case as properly report-
able by the bankruptcy estate.283
IX. THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE ACT
Although the Act is a substantial improvement over earlier draft ver-
sions284 and incorporates many changes previously advocated by the bank-
ruptcy bar and other interested parties, 28 5 its provisions regarding attribute
reduction seriously limit the effectiveness of the new Bankruptcy Code re-
organization provisions and are inconsistent with the basic purposes of a
bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. Because the attribute reduction
provisions of the Act will not be effective until January 1, 1982, remedial
legislative action with respect to these provisions is still possible.
The attribute reduction provisions of the Act overlook three important
considerations. First, retention of net operating loss carryovers or other
tax attributes by a debtor that experiences a cancellation of indebtedness
pursuant to a bankruptcy proceeding does not give such a debtor a head
start. The plan resulting from the bankruptcy proceeding has been negoti-
ated between the debtor and its creditors, and a sound creditors' committee
should be able to ensure that creditors receive any excess cash derived
from the utilization of a net operating loss carryover. Any reduction in net
operating loss carryovers and other tax attributes, therefore, results in a
direct cash drain out of the creditors' pockets. The apparent result is a
"Catch-22" situation in which the creditors' debts are further reduced, re-
sulting in greater debt discharge amounts and further reductions of the
debtor's tax attributes.
Secondly, proponents of the tax attribute reduction provisions of the Act
have failed to consider whether these provisions actually will increase rev-
enues to the Treasury. The Committee Report states that some revenue
279. I.R.C. § 1398(g).
280. Id § 1398(i).
281. Id § 1398(e).
282. Id§ 13980)(2).
283. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 25-26. Moreover, the income tax liability of
the bankruptcy estate will be computed as if the estate were an individual. I.R.C. § 1398(c).
284. For a discussion of an earlier draft of the Act, see Rabinowitz & Rubin, The Bank-
ruptcy Act o/1980-H.R. 5043: Proposalsfor New Tax Treatment of Debtors and Creditors,
57 TAXES 911 (1979).
285. BNA Daily Tax Report No. 189, at G-1 to -4 (Sept. 27, 1979); BNA Daily Tax
Report No. 190, at K-5 to -6 (Sept. 28, 1979).
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gain will result, but it probably will be offset by some revenue loss in con-
nection with the new reorganization provisions added by the Act.286 The
proponents of attribute reduction have overlooked the probability that at-
tribute reduction will destroy the ability of many debtors to recover from
financial chaos and continue as operating entities. Moreover, a successful
bankruptcy reorganization gives creditors and other interested parties an
opportunity to supply additional goods and services to the rehabilitated
debtor, permits the debtor to continue the long-term employment of those
individuals in need of steady work, and provides the Service and other
taxing authorities with a continuing economic entity that presumably will
generate profits in the future and pay taxes upon those profits. In the ag-
gregate, these potential future taxes should far exceed those taxes resulting
from a bankruptcy liquidation in which the debtor meets its demise due to
an overly burdensome tax law. The purpose of a chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion case under the Bankruptcy Code is to provide the debtor with a fresh
start, to provide creditors with an opportunity to recoup their claims, to
provide suppliers with an ongoing entity that will purchase goods and
services from such suppliers, to provide employees with continued employ-
ment, to provide the community with an economic entity, and to provide
the taxing authorities with a rehabilitated debtor capable of earning profits
and paying taxes.
Thirdly, attribute reduction is not necessarily directly related to those
debts that are cancelled in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, an immediate
head start to the discharged debtor does not always result. The Service
acknowledged this concept in ruling that discharge of indebtedness has no
effect on net operating losses of the debtor.287
The rehabilitated debtor causes a favorable ripple effect and generates a
significant positive contribution to the community and to the economy in
general. A successful rehabilitation often will result in the generation of
substantially greater tax revenues than the small sums that will be col-
lected in connection with a liquidation of the debtor. By advocating its
priority and nondischargeability advantages, the Service has maintained in
most instances the short-sighted viewpoint that it must collect its pre-peti-
tion taxes in full, even if the collection of such taxes destroys the debtor by
preventing its reorganization into a long-term and ongoing business.
The old Bankruptcy Act contained a simple and workable formula for
the tax treatment of cancellation of indebtedness in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing. Generally, no gain was recognized from the forgiveness of debt in
such a proceeding, and the debtor made a downward adjustment of the
bases in its assets in certain instances. The old Act was simple and consis-
tent for the purposes of reorganization, insofar as it maximized the amount
286. Committee Report, supra note 72, at 41.
287. In Rev. Rul. 58-600, 1958-2 C.B. 29 the Service ruled that cancellation of indebted-
ness did not affect the debtor's net operating loss carryovers. Arguably this position is based
on the inability to match cancelled debts neatly with the deductible cash expenditures that
gave rise to the losses. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
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of cash flowing to creditors and did not confer a head start benefit to the
discharged debtor. Elimination of net operating loss carryovers and tax
attributes under the Bankruptcy Tax Act will render many reorganizations
economically impracticable, because the potentially rehabilitated debtor is
deprived of the working capital necessary to carry on its operations and
make further payments to creditors. Moreover, it will entail significantly
greater expenses for attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and other profes-
sional persons, due to the complexity of determining the appropriate tax
treatment of a reorganization. Reorganization of a small business debtor
in a chapter 11 case is already an expensive endeavor; in many instances
the debtor cannot bear the additional cost of tax counsel that seemingly
will be required under the Bankruptcy Tax Act.
The Bankruptcy Tax Act should be amended before the January 1, 1982,
effective date for attribute reduction to provide that a bankrupt or insol-
vent debtor is not taxed upon income from cancellation of indebtedness,
and that the tax attributes of a bankrupt or insolvent debtor are not re-
duced by the amount of the indebtedness forgiven. To alleviate the abuses
that have resulted from the exploitation of section 108 by solvent debtors,
section 108 should be repealed; solvent debtors should recognize income
from cancellation of indebtedness, with the tax upon such income to be
payable at the time when the cancelled debt would have been payable.
Alternatively, the payment of such tax could be spread over a reasonable
period of time, perhaps ten years. Implementation of these suggestions
will result in a positive revenue impact for the Treasury, generate greater
returns to creditors, and be consistent with both the tax policy and the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
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